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Abstract
In the present article, the authors provide a general overview of the academic and
legal debate on the regulation of access to and use of genetic information by non-
medical actors. Their aim is to give some insight in the academic views on the
need to introduce specific genetics legislation and on the balance that might be
struck between the various interests concerned. Furthermore, by analyzing relevant
legislation and policy measures in the US and in Europe, they identify the issues
that are deemed relevant in considering and, eventually, introducing regulative
measures with respect to genetic information.
1. Introduction
As a result of the fast developments in genetic science, much information is
presently available about the influence of genetic factors on the onset of illness
and disease. By means of genetic testing, genetic anomalies and defects can be
detected that may contribute to the development of diseases and disorders, or that
may aggravate health risks related to specific working or living circumstances.
The availability of such information about individual health risks is highly valuable
because of the possibility of prevention and early treatment of serious diseases,
but it has also caused social unrest and concern. Some concern is effected by the
fact that it is now possible for individuals to learn about the possibility of getting
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ill in the future with much more certainty, while there is not always a certainty
of there being a medical remedy – awareness of genetic risks may thus cause strong
feelings of anxiety. For another part, the concern is caused by the fact that genetic
information may also become available to non-medical actors such as insurers
and employers. For insurers, predictive health information is of great importance
to risk classification: the more precisely an insurer can estimate the health or
mortality risks of an individual, the more accurate his risk classification will be.
This may be favourable to individuals with demonstrable low health risks, who
will need to pay lower insurance premiums, but to high risk persons, there may
be a danger of the rates becoming so high that they are effectively excluded from
the possibility of getting health, life or disability insurance. Employers may like-
wise be interested in genetic information about (prospective) employees, as high
risk employees may pose high business risks and may lead to high costs. If such
risks and costs can be avoided by genetic screening and by excluding or dismissing
any high risk employees, some employers will clearly be willing to do so. Many
fear that this would, in the end, pose a risk for complete exclusion of high risk
individuals from the employment market. To these concerns should be added that
individual rights of confidentiality of personal medical information, the right ‘not
to know’ about serious health risks and the right to non-discrimination may be
seriously at risk if non-medical actors have unlimited access to genetic information.
These concerns are by now well-known. A large body of literature is available
on the ethical, social and legal implications of the availability of genetic informa-
tion. Furthermore, policy makers and legislators, as well as employers and the
insurance industry have reacted to the situation of social unrest by introducing
restrictive legislation, policy measures and self-regulation. This has resulted in
a wide variety of policy approaches, varying from the adoption of highly detailed
provisions restricting the use of genetic information, to constitutional provisions
protecting genetic privacy and non-discrimination interests in general. Varying
answers have also been given to questions with respect to the definition of genetic
information; the scope of genetics legislation; the difference between genetic
information and other types of predictive health information; and the instruments
that must be chosen to defy genetic discrimination and protect genetic privacy.
In the present article, we would like to provide a general overview of the
academic and legal debate on the regulation of access to and use of genetic
information by non-medical actors. We will endeavour to provide some insight
in the academic views on the need to introduce specific genetics legislation and
on the balance that might be struck between the various interests concerned.
Furthermore, by analyzing relevant legislation and policy measures in the US and
in Europe, we aim to provide some insight in the issues that are deemed relevant
in considering and, eventually, introducing regulative measures with respect to
genetic information. In doing so, this article draws on the results of the research
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project “Genetic Discrimination and Genetic Privacy in a Comparative Perspective”,
which the present authors, together with Prof. A.W. Heringa, have conducted as
part of a larger project concerning “Genetic Traits and Non-Discrimination”.1
We mainly aim to present a further developed and updated version of the main
conclusions of this research project. The academic and comparative studies on
which these conclusions are based are reflected in a far more elaborate and detailed
fashion in other publications.2
The present article is structured in three parts. In the first part, we will provide
some insight in the academic debate about genetics exceptionalism and the defini-
tion of genetic information (§ 2) and we will give an overview of the various
interests which may be concerned by restricting access to and use of genetic
information by insurers and employers (§ 3). In the second part, we present a
concise overview of the way a number of important regulatory issues have been
dealt with in the United States, the EU and a number of European states (§ 4).
Such an overview enables a comparison to be made between theoretical and
practical approaches and makes it possible to discern important points of consensus
and disagreement. In the third part of this article, we combine the academic insights
discussed in the first part with the experience in the member states as described
in the second part, in order to provide an outline of the way in which a variety
of issues relating to the regulation of genetic and other forms of predictive health
information may be solved in the future (§ 5).
2. ‘Genetic’ information as a basis for regulation? The case against
genetics exceptionalism
2.1 Introduction
An important topic in the debate about the use of genetic information by insurers
and employers is the appropriateness of what is often called the theory of ‘genetics
exceptionalism’. According to this theory, genetic information is notably different
1 The latter project formed part of the research programme “The Societal Component of
Genomics Research” of the Netherlands Organisation of Scientific Research. The research
project also resulted in a report in the Dutch language on protection against genetic
discrimination: J.K.M. Gevers, A.C. Hendriks, J.H. Gerards, H.L. Janssen and A.W.
Heringa, Bescherming tegen genetische discriminatie. Een juridische analyse, Leiden:
Stichting NJCM-Boekerij 2004.
2 See in particular J.H. Gerards, A.W. Heringa and H.L. Janssen, Genetic Discrimination
and Genetic Privacy in a Comparative Perspective, Antwerp: Intersentia 2005.
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from all other kinds of health information, including other kinds of predictive
health information. It is often argued that the special character of genetic informa-
tion would easily lead to misuse by non-medical actors, which would call for
special and well-tailored legislative protection. Whether genetic information is
indeed so special as to warrant exceptional treatment is, however, subject to debate.
Some have opposed the argument that genetic information can be distinguished
from other information, while others acknowledge the exceptional character of
genetic information, but deny the need to single out such information for special
protection. Furthermore, even if there is a good reason to distinguish genetic
information from other types of personal health information, the question remains
what kind of information can be considered to constitute ‘genetic’ information.
According to some, a narrow definition should be preferred, which means that
only the information provided by DNA tests could properly be called ‘genetic
information’. Others have argued that such a definition is underinclusive and that
there are many other types of health information that give insight in someone’s
genetic makeup, such as family medical history. These definitional problems are
sometimes considered to provide an additional reason against the introduction of
legislation solely geared to genetic information. Further, even adherents of the
theory of genetics exceptionalism agree that it is difficult to opt for a proper
definition of the notion of genetic information.
In this section, we will shortly discuss the various arguments that have been
put forward in the academic debate about genetics exceptionalism and the debate
relating to the definition of genetic information. We will then formulate some
conclusions as to the reasonableness of taking genetics exceptionalism as a basis
for regulation.
2.2 Arguments in favour of genetics exceptionalism
Limited (actual) predictive character
Although the value of genetic data is widely recognized, the actual predictive value
of most genetic information is still rather limited. Many genetic tests often provide
relatively inaccurate information and test results are difficult to interpret.3 Although
this will certainly change with the rapid scientific developments in this area, genetic
3 Cf. Genetic Testing: Preliminary Policy Guidelines, Report by the Council for Responsible
Genetics, June 2006, <www.gene-watch.org/programs/privacy/guidelines.html> (last
accessed 23 August 2006); Promoting Safe and Effective Genetic Testing in the United
States. Final Report of the Task Force on Genetic Testing, September 1997; and H.T.
Greely, ‘Genotype Discrimination: The Complex Case for Some Legislative Protection’,
149 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1483 (2001), p. 1501.
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data thus not always provide reliable information about actual health risks. It is
well-known, moreover, that by far the most ‘genetic’ diseases are not purely genetic
in character, but are caused by a complex combination of genetic and environ-
mental factors.4 In such cases of multi-factorial disease, it is difficult to predict
whether a genetic defect will indeed bring about the onset of a certain illness or
disease. In many cases, such may depend on lifestyle (smoking habits, diet, phy-
sical exercise) or on exposure to certain toxins or stress. Moreover, even in the
case of monogenic diseases (e.g. Huntington’s disease) the actual predictive value
of genetic data is relatively limited. A genetic test may in that case accurately
predict that the disease will develop, but it will not provide any information as
to the exact date on which the condition will manifest itself, nor to the seriousness
of the symptoms.5 Some commentators contend that it is precisely this limited
probability and reliability that sets genetic information apart from other medical
data.
Uniquely private character of genetic information
Another reason to treat genetic information differently lies in the highly personal
character of such information. An individual’s genotype is unalterable and unique,
which implies, according to some authors, that disclosure of information about
someone’s genotype would expose the essence of his being.6 As a result, genetic
information is highly important to the individual and his ability to make personal
4 See further R. Hoedemakers and H. ten Have, ‘Genetic Health and Genetic Disease’, in:
V. Launis, J. Pietarinen and J. Räikkä (eds.),Genes and Morality. New Essays, Amsterdam/
Atlanta: Rodopi 1999, p. 134-135 and Schlussbericht der Enquete-Kommission ‘Recht und
Ethik der modernen Medizin’, Deutscher Bundestag, 14. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 14/9020,
14 May 2002, p. 121.
5 Cf. L. Gostin, ‘Genetic Discrimination: the Use of Genetically Based Diagnostic and
Prognostic Tests by Employers and Insurers’, 17 American Journal of Law and Medicine
109 (1991), p. 113, H.T. Greely, supra (footnote 4), p. 1486 and E. Oscapella, Genetics,
Privacy and Discrimination. Report prepared for the Canadian Biotechnology Advisory
Committee; Project Steering Committee on Genetic Privacy, October 2000, available via
<www.cbac-cccb.ca> (last accessed 23 August 2006), p. 22.
6 See e.g. J.A. Colby, ‘An Analysis of Genetic Discrimination Legislation Proposed by the
105th Congress’, 24 American Journal of Law and Medicine 443 (1998), p. 457, M. Powers,
‘Justice and Genetics: Privacy Protection and the Moral Basis of Public Policy’, in: M.A.
Rothstein (ed.), Genetic Secrets. Protecting Privacy and Confidentiality in the Genetic
Era, Yale University Press: New Haven and London 1997, p. 368 and G.J. Annas, L.H.
Glantz and P.A. Roche, ‘Drafting the Genetic Privacy Act: Science, Policy, and Practical
Considerations’, 23 Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 360 (1995), p. 360.
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choices, for instance with respect to lifestyle or reproduction.7 This importance
is even greater because of the present existence of the so-called ‘therapeutic gap’:
Although it is possible to detect a large number of genetic anomalies by means
of genetic testing, the development of therapies for the resulting disease lags
behind. As a consequence a person who would undergo a genetic test, for instance
to obtain a life insurance policy, might well discover that he is genetically pre-
disposed to develop a disease that is currently untreatable. It is not difficult to
imagine the stress and anxiety caused by such a discovery, especially if regard
is also being had to the fact that the information may be relevant to the individual’s
relation to his relatives and his reproductive choices.8 Unwarranted disclosure
of genetic information should be avoided precisely for that reason.
Risk for discrimination against certain groups; eugenics
Some genetic predispositions are particular to racial or ethnic groups (e.g. pre-
disposition to sickle cell anaemia, cystic fibrosis and Tay Sachs disease), or to
one of the sexes (e.g. predisposition to breast cancer).9 If such genetic information
were used to a negative effect by employers and insurers, such might impede the
access of these groups to employment or health care.
Further, it is sometimes argued that the use of genetic information in decision-
making may lead to stigmatisation.10 Just like personal characteristics such as
ethnicity and sex, and unlike other factors that may influence one’s state of health
(e.g. dietary and smoking habits), genetic features are currently unalterable.11
7 It may happen, for example, that a person discovers that he is the carrier of a gene which
might result in the development of a genetic disease in his offspring, or that he has a
genetic anomaly that may result in the onset of a disease in combination with certain
lifestyle factors (such as smoking habits or stress).
8 Difficult ethical questions may arise with respect to the disclosure of genetic information
to blood relatives and their right “not to know”. See G. Laurie, Genetic Privacy. A
Challenge to Medico-Legal Norms, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002, p. 93
and A. Silvers and M.A. Stein, ‘An Equality Paradigm for Preventing Genetic Discrimi-
nation’, 55 Vanderbilt Law Review 1341 (2002), p. 1357.
9 See e.g. J.L. Dolgin, ‘Personhood, Discrimination and the New Genetics’, 66 Brooklyn
Law Review 755 (2000), p. 790/791.
10 Cf. S. Mezoff, ‘Forcing a Square Peg into a Round Hole: The Negative Ramifications
of Misaligned Protection for Predisposed Individuals under the ADA’, 85 Boston University
Law Review 323 (2005), p. 338 and J.L. Dolgin, supra (footnote 9), p. 772/773.
11 Cf. L. Gostin, supra (footnote 6), p. 110; see also S.M. Suter, ‘The Allure and Peril of
Genetics Exceptionalism: Do We Need Special Genetics Legislation?’, 79 Washington
University Law Quarterly 669 (2001), p. 712, who accepts that it is important that a certain
factor is out of someone’s control, even though she denies that genetic risks belong to
the category of factors that cannot be influenced by the individual.
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Genetic information is for that reason considered to constitute an unfair basis for
distinction.12
The fear for such forms of direct or indirect discrimination is particularly
present in the US and Germany, where the negative consequences of (mis)use
of genetic information have been experienced in the past. Various sources mention
the American history of large-scale screening of African-Americans for sickle cell
anaemia and sterilisation of convicts whose criminal behaviour was suspected to
be inheritable, or recall the dreadful experiments of Nazi-German ‘eugenics’.13
In both countries, these experiences have increased the awareness of the danger
of abuse, resulting in a strong call for special protection and strict regulation. In
the US, the negative experiences in the past are even mentioned as one of the main
reasons for introducing federal legislation to protect genetic information.14
Combination of characteristics
Many academic commentators acknowledge that the aforementioned features may,
in themselves, not be unique to genetic information, but may also be relevant to
certain types of non-genetic health information. They argue, however, that genetic
information is different from other health information, as all factors mentioned
above appear in combination. In addition it is sometimes stressed that genetic
information is unique because society regards it as unique.15 This social rather
than scientific reason for distinguishing between genetic and other types of health
information is considered to be sufficient to justify special legislative treatment
of genetic information.
12 See E. Wright Clayton, ‘Informed Consent and Genetic Research’, in: M.A. Rothstein
(ed.), Genetic Secrets. Protecting Privacy and Confidentiality in the Genetic Era, Yale/
London: Yale University Press 1997, p. 127, B.M. Knoppers, ‘Who Should have Access
to Genetic Information?’, in: J. Burley (ed.), The Genetic Revolution and Human Rights,
Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999, p. 45 and J.L. Dolgin 2000, supra (footnote 9),
p. 772/773.
13 E.g. C.S. Diver and J.M. Cohen, ‘Genophobia: What is Wrong with Genetic Discrimina-
tion?’, 149 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1439 (2001), pp. 100 and 107, G.J.
Annas, ‘Genetic Privacy: There Ought to be a Law’, 4 Texas Review of Law and Politics
9 (1999), p. 12 and D. Hellman, ‘What Makes Genetic Discrimination Exceptional?’, 29
American Journal of Law & Medicine 77 (2003), p. 106ff.
14 See in particular the findings included in the new bill for the Genetic Information Genetic
Nondiscrimination Act of 2005 (S. 206, introduced in the Senate on 7 February 2005 by
Senator Olympia Snowe), which was passed by the US Senate in February 2005, §§ 2
and 3.
15 M.A. Rothstein, ‘Genetic Secrets: A Policy Framework’, in: M.A. Rothstein (ed.),Genetic
Secrets. Protecting Privacy and Confidentiality in the Genetic Era, Yale/London: Yale
University Press 1997, p. 459.
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2.3 Arguments against genetics exceptionalism
According to opponents of the theory of genetics exceptionalism, none of the
features discussed above would justify singling out genetic information for special
protection. Opponents defend their point of view primarily by rebutting the
aforementioned arguments. The argument that genetic information is uniquely
personal in character is, for example, refuted by stating that this may also be true
for other personal information, such as finger prints or iris scans.16 Further it
is often argued that non-genetic health information may have just as much rel-
evance for close relatives as genetic information has.17 Even the argument of
stigmatisation is sometimes called into question, pointing out that HIV patients
also have been (and are still being) stigmatised and discriminated against.18 Fur-
ther, it is stressed that the information content of non-genetic predictive information
may often be higher than that of genetic information. Genetic information relating
to multi-factorial of polygenic diseases may not always have strong predictive
value, while this can be very different for information about HIV or high choles-
terol level.19 Finally, it is often argued that, as long as no effective therapies are
discovered for a certain disease, the fact that a known risk for developing such
a disease is genetic or non-genetic in character will not make any difference for
16 Cf. L.O. Gostin and J.G. Hodge, ‘Genetic Privacy and the Law: An End to Genetics
Exceptionalism’, 40 Jurimetrics Journal 21 (1999), p. 35.
17 The information is different to the extent that genetic predispositions can only be trans-
mitted from parent to child, while non-genetic predispositions can be transmitted in a
variety of ways. See M.J. Green and J.R. Botkin, ‘‘Genetic Exceptionalism’ in Medicine:
Clarifying the Differences between Genetic and Nongenetic Tests’, 138 Annals of Internal
Medicine 2003, p. 572.
18 Cf. L.F. Ross, ‘Genetic Exceptionalism vs. Paradigm Shift: Lessons from HIV’, 29 Journal
of Law, Medicine and Ethics 141 (2001), p. 141/142; see also S.M. Suter, supra (footnote
12), p. 710, stating that virtually every group is at increased risk for a few genetic condi-
tions, meaning that genetic information in practice never singles out particular groups more
than others.
19 Cf. Ethical, legal and social aspects of genetic testing: research, development and clinical
applications, Report of the Independent Expert Group, Brussels: European Commission
2004, p. 32 (available via < http://europa.eu.int/comm/research/science-society/index_en.
html>, last visited 23 August 2006). Of course, certain genetic anomalies may indicate
a more positive and substantial risk to future illness than abnormalities discovered by non-
genetic tests, especially if monogenic diseases are concerned. Cf. M.J. Green and J.R.
Botkin 2003, supra (footnote 19), p. 572. The point is, however, that genetic information
does not per se have a higher information content and predictive value than other individual
health information. See also A. Silvers and M.A. Stein, ‘Human Rights and Genetic
Discrimination: Protecting Genomics Promise for Public Health’, 31 Journal of Law,
Medicine & Ethics 377 (2003), p. 381/382.
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the stress and anxiety that an individual will experience if the risk factor is
detected.20
Finally, opponents of genetics exceptionalism point out that special treatment
of genetic information might lead to unjustified distinctions between persons who
are and who are not genetically predisposed to a certain disease.21 The risk to
develop a disease in the future may sometimes be predicted by genetic anomalies,
but the same condition may be caused by a range of other factors such as life-style.
In the case of breast cancer or heart failure, for instance, some persons will have
a genetic predisposition to develop the condition or disease, whereas others will
develop the disease as a result of other (known or yet unknown) causes. A pro-
hibition of the use of genetic information by employers and insurers may thus
have the result that a person with a genetic predisposition is well-protected against
negative insurance or employment decisions, while such protection is withheld
from a person whose enlarged risk is clear from environmental factors.22 Seen
from the perspective of optimally inclusive protection against misuse of personal
information in general, the differences between genetic information and other kinds
of predictive health information seem to be too small to justify different treat-
ment.23
From this perspective it is often stated that there is no reason to single out genetic
information for protection against misuse by insurers and employers. Instead,
commentators have argued that legislation should be drafted that is protective of
all predictive health information, regardless of its source or the character of the
disease it is predicting.24 Such comprehensive legislation would have the clear
advantage of offering more inclusive protection against the use of private health
information by employers and insurers.
2.4 Additional difficulties: how to define ‘genetic information’
In addition to these arguments against genetics exceptionalism, the point has been
made that genetic information is highly difficult to define. At present, two general
approaches to the definition of genetic information can be distinguished in aca-
20 Cf. M.J. Green and J.R. Botkin 2003, supra (footnote 17), p. 573. Mutatis mutandis,
advances in therapy may lead to normalization of practices and policies, as is shown by
the example of HIV; see L.F. Ross 2001, supra (footnote 18), p. 142.
21 Cf. L.O. Gostin and J.G. Hodge 1999, supra (footnote 17), p. 23/24.
22 Cf. M.A. Rothstein, supra (footnote 16), p. 459.
23 Cf. M.J. Green and J.R. Botkin 2003, supra (footnote 17), p. 571.
24 E.g. L.O. Gostin and J.G. Hodge, supra (footnote 16), p. 56.
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demic literature.25 Some have argued that only the results of the DNA-test that
may yield information about an individual’s DNA can truly be considered as
genetic information. This approach is generally known as the source-based
approach: the information exclusively originates from genetic tests. Within the
source-based approach, subdivisions are also possible. Some definitions only
consider data from a DNA-test as genetic data,26 whereas others also include
the results of RNA-tests or results of a cholesterol-test from which genetic informa-
tion can be derived.27 The Swiss legislation on genetic research on humans pro-
vides an excellent example.28 A number of other commentators have contended
that the term should be given a broader definition – these commentators adhere
to the content-based approach. In this approach, the notion of genetic information
should also be held to cover information that has been disclosed by genetic tests
25 See J.K.M. Gevers et al., supra (footnote 1), p. 5 and D. Hellman, supra (footnote 13),
p. 82.
26 See G.J. Annas, L.H. Glantz and P.A. Roche, supra (footnote 6), p. 362, defining ‘private
genetic information’ as ‘any information about an identifiable individual that is derived
from the presence, absence, alteration, or mutation of a gene or genes, or the presence
or absence of a specific DNA marker or markers, and which has been obtained 1) from
the analysis of the individual’s DNA or (2) from an analysis of the DNA of a person to
whom the individual is related’. The Austrian Gentechnikgesetz defines genetic data as
data originating from genetic analysis. See art. 4 (23) of the Gentechnikgesetz (Gene
technology act): ‘Genetische Analyse: Laboranalyse, die zu Aussagen über konkrete
Eigenschaften hinsichtlich Anzahl, Struktur oder Sequenz von Chromosomen, Genen oder
DNA – Abschnitten oder von Produkten der DNA und deren konkrete chemische Modifika-
tionen führt, und die damit nach dem Stand von Wissenschaft und Technik Aussagen über
einen Überträgerstatus, ein Krankheitsrisiko, eine vorliegende Krankheit oder einen
Krankheits- oder Therapieverlauf an einem Menschen ermöglicht’.
27 Such as the analysis of proteins or metabolites which does not primarily aim at the revela-
tion of genetic information, but at the same time may disclose information about genetic
anomalies.
28 Art. 3 of the Bundesgesetz über genetische Untersuchungen beim Menschen (Federal act
on genetic testing on human being). ‘Genetic information’ encompasses ‘Informationen
über das Erbgut einer Person, die durch eine genetische Untersuchung gewonnen werden,
einschliesslich des DNA-Profils’ (art. 3 l). ‘Genetische Untersuchungen’ encompass in
their turn ‘zytogenetische und molekulargenetische Untersuchungen zur Abklärung ererbter
oder während der Embryonalphase erworbener Eigenschaften des Erbguts des Menschen
sowie alle weiteren Laboruntersuchungen, die unmittelbar darauf abzielen, solche Informa-
tionen über das Erbgut zu erhalten’ (art. 3 a) and the DNA-profil ‘die für ein Individuum
spezifische Information, die mit Hilfe molekulargenetischer Techniken aus den nicht-
codierenden Abschnitten der DNA gewonnen wird’ (art. 3 k).
REGULATION OF GENETIC AND OTHER HEALTH INFORMATION 349
of family members or by medical data about family members that reveal informa-
tion about inheritable characteristics.29
In academic literature, it is often pointed out that a source-based approach may
lead to underinclusiveness, which means that information that is deemed desirable
to be covered, may not be covered at all. Information that may be predictive about
a person’s future health status can also be derived from other sources than from
a DNA-test. Information deriving from observance of behaviour of an individual
or from the medical family history can be equally informative about one’s future
health status. Characteristics that can only be known from DNA-tests would then
be treated differently from other sources of information, even if both types of
information provide knowledge about the individuals’ genotype and future health
risks. For reasons of underinclusiveness, the broader content-based definition has
been favoured in academic literature. In the content-based approach, the notion
of genetic information covers a broad range of predictive and diagnostic medical
information which is obtained from various tests, not only tests of DNA. Genetic
information may be derived from family medical history, from testing (tests either
directed immediately to genetic information or tests that are directed to other health
information but that may also yield genetic information, such as blood tests or
urine tests) but also from information derived from observance of an individual’s
behaviour.
On the other hand, it is clear that the content-based definition, regardless of its
strongly protective character, brings some problems of its own. It is clear in
particular that such a definition will almost certainly cause problems for insurers
and employers in acquiring and using genetic information. Especially the fact that
both family medical history and information about inheritable characteristics
revealed by such history are covered by content-based definitions of genetic
information is troublesome to insurers. Many insurers presently ask for information
about family medical history in the contracting procedure. A prohibition on the
use of this type of information would thwart a commonly used and accepted
29 This does not only cover genetic information which is revealed by genetic or medical tests
or by information about family medical history, but also information which is derived from
observance of an individual’s behaviour (for example, a child’s behaviour may disclose
characteristics of Down’s syndrome, enabling a physician to detect a genetic defect without
asking for family medical history or conducting a genetic test) or from personal health
information. The Dutch Law on Medical Examination that applies to medical examinations
for insurance and employment refers to ‘gezondheidstoestand’ (health status) and not
specifically to ‘genetic information’. See also C.S. Diver and J.M. Cohen 2001, supra
(footnote 13), p. 1453.
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insurance practice and would obstruct the process of risk calculation for insurers.
A broad definition may also hamper the interests of employers who for instance
may wish to protect their employees against exposure to toxins for which a parti-
cular genetic sensitivity exists.30 For that reason, legislation and policy measures
that are based on the content based approach should at least include a number
of exceptions and justification clauses.31
Thus, it is difficult to decide for one definition or the other. The uncertainty with
respect to the probabilistic value of genetic tests results urges many legislators
for precaution with regard to balancing the various interests. In the United King-
dom and in Germany, the definitional uncertainty was one of the reasons to await
further developments with regard to genetic information, before initiating legis-
lation.32 In those states where action has been taken, the dilemma is solved in
highly differing ways. In the US, the genetic non-discrimination bills show a
variant of the content-based approach, covering an individual’s genetic test (in-
cluding tests of DNA and RNA, chromosomes, proteins, and metabolites that detect
genotypes, mutations or chromosomal changes), information about genetic tests
of family members of the individual, and information about the occurrence of a
disease or disorder in family members. This wide definition and the resulting scope
of protection is narrowed, however, by excluding any information about the sex
or age of an individual and information about chemical, blood or urine analyses,
unless these analyses are genetic tests, and information about physical exams of
the individuals or other information that indicates the current health status of the
individual. Comparable wide definitions are visible in the Dutch legislation which
covers genetic information in the broader content-based definition, i.e. “health
information”. On the other hand, much more narrow definitions have been adopted
in Austria, Belgium and France. There, genetic information is defined as informa-
tion derived from genetic testing.33 Interestingly, however, this definition does
not expressly exclude family medical history.34
There seems to be no consensus at all with respect to the proper definition
of genetic information. Although the content-based definition is mostly preferred
30 The broad definition could have counterproductive effects, since it could stand in the way
of (accommodating) measures which are meant to prevent the onset of a genetic disease
or reduce its symptoms, such as specific measures to prevent exposure to work toxins of
a person with a genetically determined heightened susceptibility to such toxins.
31 J.H. Gerards, ‘General Issues concerning Genetic Information’, in:Genetic discrimination
and Genetic Privacy, supra (footnote 2), p. 12.
32 See Section 4.4 below on regulative possibilities.
33 See also Section 4.6 below on wide and narrow exceptions.
34 See Section 4.4.2 below.
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because of the level of protection it provides, this definition also has disadvantages
to the market sectors at issue. These differences are currently reflected in the
approach taken by the various states, which does not seem to show any conceptual
agreement.
2.5 Conclusion: (predictive) health information as a basis for regula-
tion
Although the arguments pro and contra genetics exceptionalism have not much
changed over the last decade, the outcome of the debate seems to have shifted
somewhat. Ten years ago, by far the most academic commentators seemed to
favour special genetics legislation because of the exceptional character of genetic
data and because of the special risk of misuse by non-medical actors. However,
more recent reports and articles seem to voice a different opinion. The view has
developed that, to some extent, genetic information may be considered exceptional
indeed, yet is not so different from other kinds of predictive health information
that it would deserve much stronger protection. It is now argued that regulation
of access to and use of health information should not be limited to genetic informa-
tion. An additional reason for this is found in the problems relating to the definition
of genetic information. As long as there is no common ground as to the types of
genetic information that should be protected (e.g. only DNA test results or a
broader category of information, including even family medical history), it would
not seem to be wise to take genetic information as a starting point for all kinds
legislative and policy measures. Various alternatives have been offered, such as
strengthening the protection of confidentiality of all health information; limitation
of the possibility to collect all kinds of predictive health information; or taking
the ‘information content’ of health information as a starting point for regulation.35
35 Cf. M.J. Green and J.R. Botkin 2003, supra (footnote 17), p. 573, suggesting that four
factors should be considered relevant in defining health information worthy of special
protection: the degree to which information learned from a test can be stigmatising; the
effect of the test result on others; the availability of effective interventions to alter the
natural course predicted by the information; and the complexity involved in interpreting
the results. One solution approaching this suggestion can be found in the Dutch Act on
Medical Examinations, which prohibits medical tests in the context of insurance under-
writing if the expected usefulness of the test results for the insurer are not in balance with
the risks thereof for the insured. This would be the case with a test intended to provide
information regarding the likelihood of the subject developing a serious condition which
is untreatable or which cannot be stabilised or prevented by medical intervention, or
regarding the presence of a serious, untreatable condition which might not become manifest
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In our opinion, it is not desirable to limit regulatory activities to genetic
information, whatever definition is chosen. We agree that genetic information is
exceptional in that it shows a unique combination of features. Although it is
understandable that genetic information attracts much attention and concern, we
perceive no apparent reason why the protection given to genetic information should
not also be offered to other kinds of health information. Individual privacy would
certainly be improved if a wider category of health information were protected,
while it would then also be easier to combat misuse of such information by non-
medical actors.
It is important to note, however, that the debate about regulation of health
information is not only inspired by the character of the information itself. The
interests of market actors such as insurers and employers are also relevant to
regulatory activities in this area and to choices regarding the scope of protection.
Although privacy interests would be protected by a broad ban on the collection
and use of health information, such protection might have unacceptable con-
sequences for the insurance market, or might stand in the way of valuable screening
of employees for susceptibility to workplace toxins. Furthermore, the discussion
of the definition of genetic information has shown that the choice for a certain
definitional approach is closely connected to the desired level of protection against
misuse of genetic information and the effects of a certain definition for the interests
of employers and insurers. Choices as to the covered categories of information
will therefore not only depend on the debate about genetics exceptionalism, but
also on the balance that is struck between the various interests involved.
3. Interests involved in regulating genetic and other (predictive)
health information
3.1 Introduction
Dilemmas concerning the confidentiality of medical information and privacy
questions relating to the use of health information are, of course, not new. In most
legal systems, an intricate legal system protecting confidentiality and privacy is
already in place. However, many of these regulations only deal with the use of
medical information within the medical sector and the confidentiality of medical
information that is in possession of medical practitioners. Questions as to when
until some time after the medical examination (see Section 3, subsection 2(a) of the Act
on Medical Examinations). Cf. also D. Crosbie, Protection of Genetic Information: An
International Comparison, Report to the Human Genetics Commission, September 2000.
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and under what circumstances employers or insurers could request or require an
individual to undergo a genetic test, or disclose all health information that is known
to him, often remain unanswered. It is exactly this kind of questions on which
the debate about the use of genetic information centres.
To a certain extent, the present debate about (genetic) privacy and discrimina-
tion resembles the earlier debate about the confidentiality of medical data – indeed,
comparable individual interests are at stake. However, the shift of focus of the
debate has made matters more complicated. Legislation with respect to non-medical
uses of health information will not only need to take account of individual privacy
and non-discrimination concerns, but also of the interests of market actors such
as employers and insurers and the interests of individuals of having access to the
social goods these actors hold the key to.
In this section, we provide a short overview of the most important of these
interests and their value for the debate about regulation. A detailed analysis of
the individual rights to privacy, self-determination and non-discrimination will
be left out, since these rights have been elaborately discussed and explored else-
where. Instead, we focus on the specific interests relating to the use of genetic
and other (predictive) health information by employers and insurers.36 The inter-
ests related to insurance will be discussed in section 3.2, in which we will give
an overview of the arguments pro and contra the access to predictive health
information by insurers. In section 3.3, we will shortly discuss the various interests
connected to the availability of genetic information to employers.
3.2 Insurance
3.2.1 Actuarial fairness and the risk for adverse selection
The importance of genetic information to the insurance market is strongly con-
nected with the character of the insurance system in place. On a very general level,
it is possible to distinguish two types of insurance. In the first place there are
solidarity-based insurance systems, in which everybody is insured against a certain
type of risk, such as that of high costs of health care, without there being a clear
relation between an individual’s risk level and the contribution he pays to the
insurance system. Premiums in a solidarity-based system are not based on risk
36 Although such information may be of relevance to a wide range of other market actors,
varying from reproductive counsellors to schools, insurers and employers have shown most
interest in obtaining and using genetic information. For that reason, we will concentrate
on their particular interests.
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categorisation, but are set uniformly or according to the individual’s ability to pay.
An element of compulsion is necessary to render a solidarity-based system work-
able: without such an element, ‘low risks’ (paying relatively high premiums in
comparison to their risk) would be tempted to leave the pool and seek private,
cheaper insurance schemes.37 In a solidarity-based system access to the relevant
social goods (such as health care) is guaranteed to everyone, which means that
the situation is avoided that an indigent high risk individual cannot afford the costs
of insurance and is thereby excluded from necessary help. These specific features
of solidarity-based insurance make that most of these schemes are public instead
of private in character. The most common form of solidarity-based insurance
schemes are the national health and disability insurance plans that exist in European
countries.
By contrast, most private insurance systems are based on mutuality. In such
insurance schemes an accurate classification is made in risk groups, each risk group
being charged a premium that closely corresponds with the estimated group risk.38
An important advantage of such a system is its actuarial fairness or risk-equity:
an individual will not contribute more to the insurance scheme than is reasonable
in the light of his personal risk level.39 In addition, no element of compulsion
is needed to render the system effective, since the insured will only be asked to
pay a premium that is fair in relation to his risk. In the United States, almost all
health and disability insurance schemes are based on risk classification, public
insurance schemes being the exception rather than the rule. In Europe, mutuality-
based insurance schemes are common for life insurance and long-term care insur-
ance.40
In mutuality based insurance systems, it is essential to obtain as accurate informa-
tion as possible about each individual’s risk level. The more information about
someone’s health or mortality risks is available, the more accurately the premium
can be fitted to the risk of the insured. It is for that reason that the principle of
uberrima fides (‘utmost good faith’) is of particular importance to the private
37 Cf. O. O’Neill, ‘Insurance and Genetics: The Current State of Play’, 61 Modern Law
Review 716 (1998), p. 716 and The Implication of Genetic Testing for Insurance, Report
of the Human Genetics Advisory Commission, December 1997, section 1.
38 See R.J. Pokorski, ‘Use of Genetic Information by Private Insurers’, in: T.F. Murphy and
M.A. Lappé (eds.), Justice and the Human Genome Project, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London:
University of California Press 1994, p. 93.
39 Cf. R.B. Meyer, ‘The Insurer Perspective’, in: M.A. Rothstein (ed.), Genetics and Life
Insurance. Medical Underwriting and Social Policy, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press
2004, p. 31.
40 See O. O’Neill, supra (footnote 37), p. 720.
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insurance industry, as it requires the (potential) insured to notify the insurer of
all known factors that might affect the risk classification. It will thus be clear that
predictive health information, such as genetic information, is of great value to the
private insurance industry. If genetic test results can be used to predict the onset
or development of a certain disease, health and mortality risks may be estimated
with great accuracy. Such accuracy is clearly beneficial to the industry, but also
to the individual, who will only pay a premium that is in accordance with his own
health risks.
Against this background, it is perhaps surprising that private insurers have not
yet shown much interest in obtaining genetic test results. This may be explained
by the fact that genetic tests do not always provide accurate and reliable results
and that it is still difficult to establish a clear and actuarially relevant link between
a genetic defect and a measurable health or mortality risk.41 Many insurance
companies would seem to await further technological developments before requiring
individuals to undergo a genetic test or to disclose any genetic information known
to them in the process of underwriting. Indeed, it is clear that other forms of
predictive health information (whether or not genetic in character) are already used
in the underwriting process, provided that the information is considered to be
actuarially relevant and where the use of such information is not prohibited by
legislation. This is the case, for example, with information about HIV or Hepatitis
B infection, information relating to monogenic diseases such as Huntington’s
disease or cystic fibrosis, and family medical history. It may be expected, for that
reason, that the interest of insurers in obtaining genetic data will increase as soon
as its actuarial value becomes more strongly established. The risk to individual
privacy interests is thus not negligible and it may still be desirable to adopt
measures to prevent any risk of unwarranted use in the future. For the same reason,
the fact that insurers do not at present attempt to obtain access to genetic informa-
tion on a large scale must not be taken mean that a broad prohibition on the use
41 See e.g. O. O’Neill 1998, supra (footnote 37), p. 721 and American Academy of Actuaries,
The Use of Genetic Information in Disability Income and Long-Term Care Insurance, Issue
Brief Spring 2002, p. 6. The limited actuarial value is, of course, especially relevant for
multi-factorial diseases, the onset and development of which may be determined by a wide
range of factors, including combinations of genes and environmental factors. For that reason
the insurance industry itself has developed codes of practice in which it is stated that
genetic information (when available and accessible) can be used only if they are valid
for insurance purposes, i.e. if it has been established that the information is reliable and
relevant because it indicates an increased risk (see e.g. Association of British Insurers,
Genetic Testing – ABI Code of Practice, adopted August 1999, section 6 and the recom-
mendations made by the American Academy of Actuaries, cited above, p. 9).
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of such information would not be problematic to the industry in the future. It is
in particular these future risks that have been stressed in academic comment.
In the first place, it is argued that restrictions of access to information might lead
to actuarial unfairness, since a lack of information would stand in the way of
accurate risk calculation and equitable premium rating. This might be particularly
disadvantageous for individuals with established low health risks, who would be
charged higher premium rates than appropriate.42 These groups thus have a re-
latively strong interest in being allowed to disclose such information to insurers.43
In the second place, a widely recognised problem is that restrictions on access
to predictive health information would result in an information imbalance and could
thus lead to adverse selection. By undergoing a medical (e.g. genetic) test, an
individual might learn that he has a heightened risk to develop a serious disorder
or disease in the future, without having the obligation to inform (or even being
prohibited from informing) his insurance company. The individual might then be
tempted to use his knowledge to his own advantage by trying to obtain an inclusive
insurance contract to cover his expectedly high costs of health care, or to obtain
substantial amounts of life insurance against a relatively low premium.44 If the
insurer is not aware of the individual’s extraordinary health risks, he will classify
the individual as a normal or even low risk on the basis of normal underwriting
principles, charging him a premium which is not at all in correspondence with
the actual risk. When the risk materialises in high costs of health care or in prema-
ture death, the insurer will be compelled to pay out more claims than he could
have expected on the basis of the information known to him. If this happens more
often, the insurer will need to raise the premiums to avoid further loss. Since he
42 See e.g. R.J. Pokorski, supra (footnote 38), p. 103/104.
43 It is therefore sometimes argued that individuals should be allowed to disclose information
if such would be to their advantage. The setback of such an approach is, however, that
if a question is added to a questionnaire to allow for disclosure of favorable genetic
information, this might lead insurers to follow an a contrario line of reasoning with respect
to individuals who have left the question open.
44 The process of adverse selection does not require wilful behaviour in the sense that an
individual actively engages in finding the best possible insurance against the lowest possible
price. It is also possible that he starts off a process of adverse selection by doing nothing
at all. After all, if a person learns about a genetic risk but omits to inform the insurer about
it, he will remain in a risk group where he does not belong according to the newly dis-
covered information. Since research has made clear that individuals will be easily tempted
to withhold genetic information from their insurer (see M.A. Rothstein and C.A. Hornung,
‘Public Attitudes’, in: M.A. Rothstein (ed.), Genetics and Life Insurance. Medical Under-
writing and Social Policy, Cambridge: The MIT Press 2004, p. 12/13), this risk that adverse
selection is triggered in this way is clearly present.
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does not have any means to detect which persons are withholding information,
he will need to do so indiscriminately.45 This could result in a situation in which
low risk groups loose their interest in their insurance contract, because they
consider the premiums overly high. They may even prefer to bear the risk them-
selves over paying a high monthly premium. If this happens, more premium raises
will be necessary to retain profitability, which in turn might lead to a further
outflow of relatively low risks. The final result of this development could be a
‘death spiral’, resulting in the situation in which only the highest and most unprofit-
able risks can be tempted to underwrite.46 The process of adverse selection, set
about by information imbalance, may thus result in the collapse of the entire
insurance industry.47 Even if adverse selection does not result in a ‘death spiral’,
the process may have negative effects. One problem is that insurers will set limits
to the amount of insurance individuals can buy in order to prevent high risks from
buying high amounts of insurance against a disproportionately low rate.48 As
a result, risk-avoiding low risk groups will not be able to buy as much insurance
as they would like to, or may only be able to do so against a relatively high price.
This would be disadvantageous to both the insurer and the potential insured. It
is probable, moreover, that the costs of insurance will rise, since higher premiums
are needed to compensate for the higher level of claims that have to be paid out.49
Once more, this would be disadvantageous to low risk groups, who will need to
pay a price that is higher than would be reasonable from an actuarial point of view.
This risk for adverse selection as a result of information imbalance is often con-
sidered to be the most important argument to allow insurers to acquire (genetic)
health information. Still, the force of the argument is disputed. Siegelman has
shown, for instance, that the process of adverse selection is not only dependent
on the existence of informational asymmetry, but also on a range of other factors.
His own research shows that psychological factors may cause individuals not to
act rationally and to remain with their current insurer in their current risk group.
45 Cf. M.A. Hall and S.S. Rich, ‘Laws Restricting Health Insurers’ Use of Genetic Informa-
tion: Impact on Genetic Discrimination’, 66 American Journal of Human Genetics 293
(2000), p. 301.
46 See P. Siegelman, ‘Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat’, 113
Yale Law Journal 1223 (2004), p. 1224.
47 Cf. e.g. C.S. Diver and J.M. Cohen, supra (footnote 13), p. 1467.
48 P. Siegelman, supra (footnote 46), p. 1239.
49 Cf. R.B. Meyer, supra (footnote 39), p. 30.
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This means that a death spiral will not easily be triggered.50 Others have shown
that insurers will only try to obtain information if such is cost effective and
relatively easy to do, which has led to the conclusion that insurers are less con-
cerned about access to all relevant actuarial information than is sometimes made
to believe.51 Lastly, research has shown that not every process of adverse selection
will result in a death spiral. In the end a new equilibrium will mostly be reached
between the risks insured and the premiums paid, even though the new situation
might be less profitable to the insurer.52 Thus far, no extreme cases of adverse
selection have been known to occur.53
For reasons such as these, the necessity to obtain access to genetic information
in order to avoid collapse of the entire industry seems somewhat less pressing.
This may be different for other types of (predictive) health information, but even
there the risk seems to be relatively mild. At least, it can be argued that the extent
to which the interests of insurers would be harmed by restrictions is dependent
on a number of factors that could well be taken into account in drafting legislation.
50 P. Siegelman, supra (footnote 46), p. 1248/1249 and p. 1264ff, explaining that the negative
effects of adverse selection may be partly undone by the inverse process of propitious
selection: there seems to be a negative correlation between risk aversion and riskiness,
in the sense that insurance seems to be most attractive to low-risk individuals, not to those
with the highest risks. If this is true, they will be willing to buy insurance even at rates
that would be too high from an actuarial perspective. When a low-risk group is sufficiently
risk-averse, an new equilibrium will be reached relatively fast, even in a case of informa-
tional asymmetry.
51 E.g. T. Sorell, ‘Freedom within Limits. Underwriting and Ethics’, in: Sorell, T., Health
Care, Ethics and Insurance, Routledge: Londen/New York 1998, p. 103 and N. Daniels,
‘The Genome Project, Individual Differences and Just Health Care’, in: T.F. Murphy and
M.A. Lappé (eds.), Justice and the Human Genome Project, Berkeley, Los Angeles,
London: University of California Press, 1994, p. 115ff.
52 Cf. M.A. Hall and S.S. Rich, supra (footnote 45), p. 301. This is true in particular because
even low risks will be unable or unwilling to pay for all eventual health costs (being the
result of viral infections, accidents, etc.) and will need some insurance. It is therefore
improbable that all low risk individuals will fall out the insurance system as a result of
adverse selection.
53 P. Siegelman, supra (footnote 46), p. 1254ff and R.B. Meyer, supra (footnote 39), p. 30.
Meyer argues, however, that this may also be due to the fact that, thus far, insurers have
not been deprived of the possibilities to control the mechanism.
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3.2.2 The relation between insurance and access to important social
goods
In mutuality-based insurance systems, premiums are typically fitted as closely as
possible to the expected individual risk. If the risk is very high, for instance
because a predisposition to a monogenic disease is discovered, insurance premiums
will necessarily be equally high. In a state in which health insurance is primarily
based on mutuality and insurers are not obliged to accept high health risks, as
is the case in the United States, the result may be that persons with extremely high
health risks cannot (or only at a very high price) be insured against the costs of
health care. As a result, access to health care for such persons might be effectively
blocked. It is often stressed that this is not an acceptable result. Health care is
such an important social good that access to it should be guaranteed to everyone
at all times.54 Affordable disability and long term care insurance are likewise
important to guarantee a means of subsistence to disabled and chronic ill persons,
especially where a safety net of inclusive social security benefits is not provided
for.55
Other forms of insurance, such as life insurance, may be considered to be
related to less important social goods.56 However, even life insurance may be
of great importance to an individual’s private life, since it can be used to secure
a reasonable standard of living for ones family or to obtain a mortgage.57
Hence, all forms of insurance to which individual health information is of any
relevance would seem to relate to important social goods. It might even be said
that some forms of insurance concern social rights, such as the right to health care
and subsistence. If unrestricted access to individual health information would lead
54 See e.g. T. Lemmens, ‘Selective Justice, Genetic Discrimination, and Insurance: Should
We Single Out Genes in Our Laws?’, 45McGill Law Journal 347 (2000), p. 388/389 and
N. Daniels, ‘The Functions of Insurance’, in: M.A. Rothstein (ed.), Genetics and Life
Insurance. Medical Underwriting and Social Policy, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press
2004, p. 130ff.
55 Cf. O. O’Neill, supra (footnote 37), p. 722.
56 E.g. N.E. Kass, ‘The Implications of Genetic Testing for Health and Life Insurance’, in:
Rothstein, M.A. (ed.),Genetic Secrets. Protecting Privacy and Confidentiality in the Genetic
Era, Yale University Press: Yale, London 1997, p. 305.
57 The importance of life insurance to individuals is supported by research of public attitudes
towards life and health insurance, in which 62% of the respondents stated that everyone
needs life insurance and even 82% that everyone has a right to life insurance (see M.A.
Rothstein and C.A. Hornung, ‘Public Attitudes’, in M.A. Rothstein (ed.), Genetics and
Life Insurance. Medical Underwritting and Social Policy, Cambridge: The MIT Press 2004,
p. 23).
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to undue interference with such rights, this would seem to provide a strong argu-
ment for strict regulation.
3.2.3 Conclusion
In contemplating restrictions to the use of individual health information by the
insurance industry, it is necessary to strike a balance between the various con-
flicting interests discussed above. Exactly where this balance should be struck
depends on a number of circumstances. In solidarity-based insurance systems, there
seems to be no need for balancing at all, as there is no risk classification and
therefore no need to obtain detailed individual health information. This is clearly
different for mutuality-based, private insurance systems. We have found that the
balance may be struck differently for the various type of insurance. With health
insurance, the individual right of access to affordable health care needs utmost
protection, as the situation must be avoided that the neediest persons are deprived
of health care.58 The same is true for disability insurance and long term care
insurance.59 Whatever solution is chosen here, it is important that these individual
interests be respected and protected. Of course, this can be done by the harsh
measure of prohibiting all access to individual health information with a predictive
character. As long as the therapeutic gap is as large as it is now, and as long as
the actuarial character of much predictive information is still limited, this would
seem to be the best solution. At present this solution would not seem to be overly
restrictive to insurers either, since most insurers do not yet try to obtain genetic
information and there is not much evidence of a problematic asymmetry of in-
formation.60
In the long run, when genetic research develops and more remedies become
available, and when such information grows more important as a means for risk
classification, access to genetic information may be allowed under strict conditions.
Such conditions would obviously include strict confidentiality of information, but
also protection of the individual against the distress caused by disclosure of test
results.61 Further, it is submitted that genetic information may only be used or
58 Cf. N. Daniels, supra (footnote 54), p. 130ff.
59 Cf. also N. Daniels, supra (footnote 54), p. 134/135. This does not per se imply that
everyone must be able to continue his present style of living, but at least should be entitled
to a reasonable income.
60 Cf. C.S. Diver and J.M. Cohen, supra (footnote 13), p. 1454.
61 Examples of protective measures are that test results may only be disclosed by a medical
practitioner and should be accompanied by genetic counselling.
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asked for if its actuarial value is clearly established.62 In order to secure affordable
health care for high-risk individuals who cannot afford to pay high insurance
premiums, accompanying measures should be taken. Such measures might be that
the premiums of high risk groups are partly subsidised out of general revenues;63
private insurers are obliged to accept high risks;64 or the existing social security
safety nets are strengthened.65
For life insurance, the individual interest connected to the insured good seems
to be less overriding. An individual who does not want to know about his indi-
vidual health risks may decide to forego of a life insurance policy, without this
having far reaching consequences for his health or standard of living.66 This does
not mean, however, that life insurers should have unlimited access to predictive
health information. The concerns about the actuarial value of predictive health
information and the quality of genetic test results are as valid here as they are
with respect to health care insurance. Access to predictive health information
should only be allowed under very strict conditions. A workable solution might
be found in ceiling-setting, an approach which is currently chosen in many self-
regulative systems and national legislation.67 We will further explore this possibil-
ity in Section 4.4 below.
62 In this regard, an independent expert group of the European Commission has made the
interesting recommendation to establish a consistent framework assuring the quality of
genetic testing services. Others have suggested that close collaboration between researchers,
the insurance industry and the government is needed to establish the actuarial value of
genetic discoveries. For some criteria, see also R.K. Gleeson, ‘Medical Underwriting’,
in: M.A. Rothstein (ed.), Genetics and Life Insurance. Medical Underwriting and Social
Policy, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press 2004, p. 89/90.
63 See also A.A. Dicke, ‘The Economics of Risk Selection’, in: M.A. Rothstein (ed.),Genetics
and Life Insurance. Medical Underwriting and Social Policy, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT
Press 2004, p. 69, offering several interesting alternative forms of subsidization.
64 See T. Sorell, supra (footnote 51), p. 402 and N. Daniels, supra (footnote 54), p. 119/120.
65 Cf. N. Daniels, supra (footnote 54), p. 131.
66 It must be stressed, though, that life insurance can relate to important social goods. The
needs for which life insurance is bought differ widely, but mostly such insurance is acquired
to provide a relative with an appropriate income after one’s death (cf. A.A. Dicke, supra
footnote 63, p. 58). In that situation the purpose of the insurance is that of providing
reasonable means of existence, which is clearly highly important. See, however, N. Daniels
2004, supra (footnote 54), p. 135, arguing that this interest could (at least partly) be served
by private insurance without this leading to unfair results.
67 See the examples of the Dutch Medical Examinations Act (in which the ceiling for life
insurance was set at C= 159,505 in 2004) and the Genetic Testing Code of Practice of the
Association of British Insurers (August 1999, in which the ceiling was set at approximately
C= 150,000). We will come back to this issue in Section 4.4 below.
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3.3 Employment
3.3.1 Financial interests of employers
Genetic information and other forms of (predictive) health information are not
only of interest to insurers, but also to employers. This is particularly true for
systems in which the employer also acts as insurer, as is often the case in the
United States. In that situation, the employer obviously has an interest in gaining
access to genetic information that is comparable to those discussed above.
Even if employers are not engaged in insurance activities, they might be
interested in knowing about genetic predispositions and health risks of their
(potential) employees. After all, if it is clear that an employee will become serious-
ly ill in the future, this will probably imply frequent absence, increased costs of
temporary replacement and decreased efficiency and productivity.68 For economic
and financial reasons, an employer may find it useful to test each job applicant
for relevant health risks or genetic anomalies.69 It has been argued, however,
that this argument should not be taken too seriously. As explained previously, many
genetic predispositions may never manifest themselves in the form of a disease
or disorder that is so serious as to severely limit one’s ability to work. It would
be undesirable to keep well-functioning and productive employees from working
without any justification other than the fear of future costs. Such employer be-
haviour would necessitate the payment of unemployment benefits, while the
individuals concerned could be highly productive and useful, perhaps for the rest
of their working lives.70 It may thus be less problematic to restrict the use of
genetic information as a basis for employment decisions than is sometimes con-
tended.
3.3.2 Health and safety of employees; public and consumer safety
One further employment concern relates to the health and safety of employees.
If an employee has to work with toxins or chemicals, it may be necessary for the
employer to know if he has a heightened susceptibility to certain toxins, in order
to enable him to take adequate preventive or accommodating measures. The same
68 On itself, this may then lead to reduced economic profits and competitiveness of the
company. Cf. M.A. Rothstein and B.M. Knoppers, ‘Legal Aspects of Genetics, Work and
Insurance in North American and Europe’, European Journal of Health Law 1996, p. 144/
145 and C.S. Diver and J.M. Cohen, supra (footnote 13), p. 1458-1459 and 1462-1463.
69 See C.S. Diver and J.M. Cohen, supra (footnote 13), p. 1464.
70 Cf. A. Silvers and M.A. Stein 2003, supra (footnote 19), p. 385.
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is true for other predictable health risks which are work-related, such as carpal
tunnel syndrome or vision problems.71 If a job applicant or employee would
appear to be unable to perform his daily functions, and reasonable accommodation
appears to be impossible, the employer might even refuse or discharge a job
applicant or employee.72 Access to predictive health information, including genetic
information, has thus clear economic advantages for the employer.73 For the
individual employee or job applicant, the advantage is equally clear. Periodic
genetic screening of employees working under hazardous conditions or being
exposed to dangerous toxins with the aim of detecting problematic genetic changes,
or pre-employment testing for heightened susceptibility, may induce the employer
to introduce adequate workplace modifications or preventive measures, or to offer
(potential) employees a different function that does not entail a heightened risk
to disease.
Some employers further have an interest in obtaining predictive health information
about (prospective) employees because of the need to guarantee public or customer
safety. An airline company or public transport service will not easily accept a job
applicant whose medical files show a high likelihood of getting a sudden heart
attack or acute vision impairment. Still, this should only be accepted if there is
clear medical proof of actual safety risks or threats and those risks and threats
which cannot be effectively reduced or controlled by frequent medical examina-
tions, preventive measures or adequate medication.
3.3.3 Access to employment
The individual interests concerned with the use of predictive health information
by employers obviously relate to access to employment. It is unacceptable if
individuals are unable to get a job, merely because of the risk that they might
develop a certain disease in the future. Although the economic and financial
71 Cf. A. Silvers and M.A. Stein 2002, supra (footnote 19), p. 1366 and Schlussbericht der
Enquete-Kommission ‘Recht und Ethik der modernen Medizin’, Deutscher Bundestag, 14.
Wahlperiode, Drucksache 14/9020, 14 May 2002, p. 139/140.
72 The extent to which an employer is allowed to refuse or discharge an individual because
of future health risks depends, of course, on choices made in national legislation.
73 Cf. E. Draper, ‘The Screening of America: The Social and Legal Framework of Employers’
Use of Genetic Information’, 20 Berkeley Journal of Employment and the Law 286 (1999),
p. 289/290.
364 JANNEKE H. GERARDS & HELEEN L. JANSSEN
concerns of employers are realistic and important, they would seem to be out-
weighed by the individual right to access to employment.74
3.3.4 Conclusion
As with insurance, it is clear that employers may have a legitimate interest in being
informed about future health risks of his employees. Careful legislation may be
drafted that allows for job-related testing and monitoring for functions to which
a certain state of health is really relevant. The use of such information as a basis
for negative employment decisions should be restricted to situations where pre-
vention or accommodation would be impossible or would lead to an unreasonable
burden for the employer. In addition, employers may be allowed to introduce
systems of genetic monitoring or genetic screening if they use it to the benefit
of employees or job applicants.
4. General issues regarding the regulation of genetic and other
(predictive) health information
4.1 Introduction
In the preceding paragraphs we have provided an overview of some important
issues pertinent to the question how to regulate the access to and use of genetic
information by non-medical actors. We have made clear that the theory of genetics
exceptionalism by now finds only limited academic support and that the notion
of genetic information is difficult to define. For that reason, we have argued that
it might be preferable to broaden the scope of any new policy or legislative
measures to the broader category of (predictive) health information and refrain
from focusing on genetic information (whether or not broadly defined). The case
for the introduction of such legislation is a strong one, as we have made clear
in Section 3. Restrictive measures do not only protect individual non-discrimination
and privacy interests, but are also necessary to secure adequate access to important
social goods such as health care, employment and disability benefits. On the other
hand, we have clarified that strongly protective legislation in this area may serious-
ly hamper a wide range of important interests, varying from economic interests
of insurers to the interests of employees in being protected against health risks
74 This individual interest is even protected as a social right by many international instruments,
such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Article 6)
and the European Social Charter (Article 1).
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in the workplace. In that regard we have also drawn some theoretical conclusions
as to where the balance between these interests might be reasonably struck.
In Sections 2 and 3 we noted that, in practice, many regulatory choices have
already been made. Many states have introduced some form of regulation of non-
medical access to predictive health information, in particular genetic information.
They have struggled to find a solution to the dilemmas described in Section 3,
but they have also dealt with a number of other important issues which are per-
tinent to the regulation of predictive health information. These issues are strongly
related to regulatory choices, which themselves interrelate with the substantive
balance that is struck between the various relevant interests. In our study, we have
distinguished five different issues which seem to be of relevance to each regulatory
decision relating to genetic or other predictive health information:
1. The choice for certain policy areas to be regulated (e.g. only employment and
insurance or a wider range);
2. The ‘level’ of regulation (i.e. the introduction of legislative measures on a
federal or supranational level, or on the level of the (member) states);
3. The choice for certain policy or legislative instruments;
4. The choice for a privacy or non-discrimination approach (i.e. protection by
privacy regulations or by a prohibition of discrimination);
5. The choice for widely or rigidly formulated legislative measures, with wide
or narrowly formulated exception clauses.
We have investigated how each of these issues have been dealt with in the United
States, a variety of European States and the European Union. In this section, we
will concisely report the results of this study, where necessary supported by an
explanation of the background of a certain approach.75
4.2 Which areas should be regulated?
4.2.1 Europe
With regard to the choice of policy areas to be regulated, some general lines can
be drawn from the legislative situations in a selected number of European states:
Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland
75 The results of the comparative study have been reported in detail in J.H. Gerards, A.W.
Heringa and H.L. Janssen, supra (footnote 2).
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and the United Kingdom.76 In addition to legal activities in European states,
legislative initiatives and policy measures within the framework of the European
Union deserve attention, since this supranational legal system has jurisdiction with
regard to matters of privacy, the prohibition of discrimination and the protection
of health.77
In Europe, it is felt that genetic information might be of interest to a broad range
of non-medical actors, ranging from commercial genetic research laboratories,
educators, health care suppliers and employers to insurers’ companies. In many
legal systems, legislative and policy steps have therefore been taken with respect
to employment- and insurance related situations. General prohibitions were for
example inserted in existing legislation: Greece inserted the protection of genetic
information in the Greek Constitution,78 while Switzerland has amended its Con-
stitution to include a prohibition on the use of genetic information without the
consent of the individual.79 In legal systems such as Switzerland, the domains
of insurance law and labour law are thus under the influence of constitutional
protection, which has important expressive value. At the same time, it must be
noted that constitutional protection applies primarily in vertical relations, i.e. the
relation between state and individual, whereas the use of genetic information
predominantly takes place in horizontal insurance and employment settings. From
this perspective, additional legislation seems essential to guarantee effective
protection.
76 This choice is based on the quick-scan that was made for the research project on genetic
discrimination and genetic privacy in a comparative perspective (see supra footnote 2 and
accompanying text). The legislative systems in the quick-scan were chosen for reasons
of providing adequate information with regard to possible policy options and choices in
legislation techniques. The variety of options and choices was of prime interest for our
study, but we are aware that other European legal systems could have provided valuable
examples as well.
77 The EC-Treaty is most relevant here. The Charter on Fundamental Rights of the EU (Nice,
2000) contains important references with regard to genetic privacy and genetic discrimina-
tion, but is not legally binding. The European institutions can furthermore issue Regulations
which are binding on its 25 member states in all aspects and means. The member states
must implement these Regulations. The European Union can also issue Directives, which
are binding as for their results, but leave the choice as to the proper means to implement
their substantive provisions to the member states. For Regulations and Directives, the EC-
Treaty must provide a legal basis, otherwise the institutions are not allowed to act.
78 See Section 4.2 on regulative possibilities.
79 See Section 4.2 on regulative possibilities and art. 119 (2) f of the Swiss Constitution.
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Pre-employment genetic tests are in most legal systems not (yet) subject to specific
legislation on genetic information. Where regulations do exist, they often allow
general medical examinations with regard to health related situations or for parti-
cular jobs, rather than restricting the use of genetic tests or providing protection
to the employees. Since specific genetics legislation is absent here, more general
principles apply, such as the confidentiality of the patient-doctor relationship or
the contractual freedom principle. In some legal systems, however, it is felt that
these principles offer insufficient protection to individual health information. The
employer’s possibilities to ask for an employee or job applicant to be tested or
to collect genetic information are subject to severe regulation in some of the states
that have been studied. Presently, Belgium, Austria, and France explicitly prohibit
genetic testing, collection and disclosure by law. Germany and the United Kingdom
do not have specific legislation with regard to job requirements, but the need for
regulation of predictive health information in the sphere of employment is currently
under debate in these countries. Legislation in the Netherlands seeks the middle
way: the Medical Examination Act seeks to regulate the use of medical examina-
tions and to restrict the scope of health inquiries in the context of access to employ-
ment, without imposing a complete prohibition of the use of any predictive health
information.
The European market for insurance has a patchwork character. There is no single
European market here, since the European Union does not have the competence
to legislate in the sphere of insurance. Moreover, the legal systems show a variety
of arrangements with regard to the design of insurances, depending on the tradi-
tional way in which, for instance, the health insurance systems have been
organised. Various types of insurance where predictive health information is of
interest to the insurers’ risk management deserve attention here. Generally, life-,
health-, and disability insurers and mortgage providers have been interested in
predictive health information since the life expectancy and/or the health condition
of the insurance taker are prime criteria for the determination of the premium or
the payment. European states generally show a concern for the implications of
access to and use of genetic information. The various legal systems arrange partly
the same and partly different types of use of genetic information in the field of
insurance. Some legal systems restrict or prohibit the collection and disclosure
of genetic information for commercial purposes, among which insurance purposes.
Other legal systems have not yet regulated the collection or disclosure of genetic
information with regard to insurance, or have only supported the introduction of
ceiling setting systems. In such a system, genetic information may play a role in
the process of underwriting if the amount of insurance asked for surpasses a certain
level. Most European states have ensured some sort of universal access to health-,
life- and disability-insurance. Health insurance is in principle accessible for every
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individual and has a public insurance character. Insurance legislation in many
European states indicates at least to some extent that there is a need to provide
a basic service to which all should have access. Standards for access are thus not
solely determined by market oriented criteria.80
4.2.2 United States
The theory of genetics exceptionalism is prevailing in the United States. Other
types of health information have been given far less consideration, even if such
information is of more interest to non-medical actors than genetic information and
poses a considerable threat to individual privacy and non-discrimination interests.
As a result of the focus on genetic information, ideas about regulation have concen-
trated on the areas in which there is a clear interest in obtaining and using such
information.81 Inquiries and research have shown that in particular insurers and
employers are interested in having access to individual health information. Anec-
dotal evidence from various sources has demonstrated that these actors are already
trying to obtain access to genetic information.82 In comparison to these actors,
other potentially interested parties (banks, reproductive consultants, schools, etc.)
seem to constitute a less immediate risk and, consequently, the need to bring them
under the scope of restrictive legislation is considered less pressing. Although it
is generally agreed upon that, in the long range, solutions should be extended to
cover these areas, an incremental approach is thus considered acceptable.83
80 See e.g. the Dutch Act on Medical Examinations. The basic principle of the Act is that
individuals must have unimpeded access to socially important facilities such as work and
certain insurance; the Act may pose a barrier to the use of genetic testing for insurance
purposes, without fully excluding them. As far as insurance contracts are concerned which
are concluded by the employer, no medical examination can be required with regard to
retirement or disablement insurance policies. Use of genetic tests is allowed if an insurance
policy is contracted by an individual or if a self-employed person wants to conclude a
civil occupational disability insurance contract.
81 See e.g. H.T. Greely, supra (footnote 3), p. 1504.
82 Cf. J.L. Dolgin, supra (footnote 9), p. 774ff. It must be admitted that such anecdotal
evidence is hardly supported by strong empirical evidence (see e.g. J. Hustead and J.
Goldman, ‘The Genetics Revolution: Conflicts, Challenges and Conundra: Genetics and
Privacy’, 28 American Journal of Law & Medicine 285 (2002), p. 294 and M.A. Hall and
S.S. Rich, supra (footnote 45), p. 302). Both studies however show an increasing interest
in genetic information, which may even further increase if genetic testing becomes a more
regular part of medical practice; cf. e.g. N.E. Kass, supra (footnote 56), p. 303/304.
83 See H.T. Greely, supra (footnote 3), p. 1505, K.L. Pickens, ‘Don’t Judge me by my Genes:
A Survey of Federal Genetic Discrimination Legislation’, 34 Tulsa Law Journal 1998,
p. 180, D. Hellman, supra (footnote 13), p. 83 and S.M. Suter, supra (footnote 11), p. 727.
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The opinion that regulation should be first and foremost concerned with genetic
information in insurance and employment finds clear expression in the regulative
activities hitherto employed at both the federal level and the level of the states.84
The focus on health insurance may be explained by the particular features of the
American health insurance system. Private health insurance in the shape of indi-
vidual and group health insurance plans is prevailing in the United States.85 Pri-
vate health insurers do not have any obligation to accept potential insureds and
there is no universal coverage.86 A number of government-sponsored public health
insurance plans are in place (such as Medicare and Medicaid), but these programs
are limited to specific groups (eligible low income groups and the elderly).87 As
a result, a relatively large number of American citizens are presently uninsured.88
If these facts are combined with the knowledge that access to health care is
effectively determined by the availability of health insurance, it is understandable
that access to genetic information by insurers is considered to constitute an im-
portant risk.89
84 For an overview of relevant existing and proposed federal legislation, see J.H. Gerards,
‘Regulation of Genetic Information in the United States’, in: Genetic Discrimination and
Genetic Privacy in a Comparative Perspective, supra (footnote 2), p. 153ff. A recent
overview of state legislation can be found via < www.genome.gov/PolicyEthics/LegData
base/pubsearch.cfm > (last visited 23 August 2006). See further the bills presented by the
109th Congress. Bill S. 306 (Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2005, introduced
in the Senate by Sen. Snowe on 7 February 2005 and passed by the Senate on 17 February
2005), is solely concerned with health insurance and employment, just like the textually
almost identical bill H.R. 1227 (introduced in the House of Representatives by Rep. Biggert
on 10 March 2005).
85 Approximately 83% of the American citizens have private health insurance (N.E. Kass,
supra (footnote 56), p. 300).
86 Cf. Ph.L. Barton, Understanding the U.S. Health Services System, Chicago/Washington,
AUPHA/HAP 1999, p. 96 and H.T. Greely, supra (footnote 3), p. 1488.
87 See further M.D. Reagan, The Accidental System. Health Care Policy in America, Boulder:
Westview Press 1999, p. 24.
88 An estimated 17% of the American population (about 40 million Americans) is presently
uninsured; see G.E. Rejda, Principles of Risk Management and Insurance, 6th Ed., Reading,
Mass.: Addison-Wesley 1998, p. 389 and N.E. Kass, supra (footnote 56), p. 300 (mention-
ing a percentage of 15).
89 This is exacerbated by the fact that most health services in the United States are also
organized by the private sector, which leads to enormous costs that have to be borne by
the government and employers offering health insurance plans. See Ph.L. Barton, supra
(footnote 86), p. 77, M.D. Reagan, supra (footnote 87), p. 64 and G.E. Rejda, supra
(footnote 88), p. 388.
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By contrast, and different from the European situation, the American life
insurance industry has been left relatively undisturbed by legislative activity.90
Where any restrictions of access to genetic information by life insurers have been
introduced at all, they are contained in state legislation.91 The reasons for this
are not quite clear, but an explanation might be found in the fact that the individual
interests harmed by the inability to obtain a life insurance policy are perceived
to be of less importance, or the life insurance industry is able to protect the
interests of actuarial fairness and individual risk classification more strongly than
the health insurance industry is.
4.3 ‘Level’ of regulation: regulation by federal/supranational or
national authorities?
4.3.1 Introduction
In general, it is possible to characterise legal systems as centralised or federal.
The United States and Germany are federal legal systems; France and the Nether-
lands are legal systems with a more centralized approach. The European Union
is a supranational legal system. Federal or supranational legal systems are typically
‘multi-level’ in character and are characterised by a more or less complex division
of powers between the various levels. In such legal systems, an answer will
unavoidably need to be given to the question whether genetics legislation or other
regulatory measures can be most appropriately and effectively introduced at federal
or supranational level, or on the level of the (member) states.92 Whether genetics
legislation may be introduced on the federal/supranational or the state level depends
on the constitutional division of powers in a particular legal system and the way
the various relevant constitutional or treaty provisions have been interpreted by
90 Cf. B.M. Knoppers, B. Godard and Y. Joly, ‘A Comparative International Overview’, in:
M.A. Rothstein, Genetics and Life Insurance. Medical Underwriting and Social Policy,
Cambridge, Mass./London: MIT Press 2004, p. 173 and D. Crosbie, supra (footnote 35),
p. 34.
91 About one-third of the states have enacted some protection against inappropriate use of
genetic information by life insurers; see National Conference of State Legislatures 2003,
<http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/ndislife.htm> (last accessed 23 August 2006).
92 The situation is even more complex in states such as Belgium or Germany, which are
federal states themselves, but also take part in the European Union. In these states, an
additional level is present, and thereby there are additional choices to be made as to the
proper level of regulation. We will not, however, pay attention to this specific situation
in this Section.
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the courts. As regards the effectiveness of regulation on one or the other level,
it is clear that all choices have advantages and disadvantages. An advantage of
national regulation or regulation at state level is, for instance, the possible tailoring
of measures to local needs. A disadvantage might be that a patchwork of standards
of protection is being created. That may be undesirable because of varying levels
of protection between states, especially in states in which insurance companies
and employers offer both intrastate and interstate service. The result may not only
be that individual rights are protected more strongly in one state than the other,
but also that the economic interests of insurers and employers are harmed because
of high administrative overhead costs. As far as the legal division of competence
allows for a choice between the various levels, such factors surely need to be taken
into account. In the sections below, we will discuss the preferred levels of regula-
tion in Europe and the United States and the legal possibilities for regulation on
such levels.
4.3.2 Europe93
In the European states under study, wide variation is visible as to regulation of
health financing and employment, legal protection of medical privacy and equality
legislation. Legislation on the supranational level of the European Union would
undoubtedly result in more uniform regulation of the access to and use of genetic
information and possibly also in more effective protection of individual privacy.
It remains to be seen, however, whether such legislation can actually be introduced
and whether there is sufficient political support to do so. Both policy reasons and
variations in the legal organisation of health insurance and other kinds of insurance
seem to hamper introduction of EU-legislation on the short term. Possibly as a
consequence of this, hardly any attention seems to be paid at the European level
to the possibility of supranational regulation of genetic discrimination or genetic
privacy. Although there is a Directive on privacy covering the protection of
personal data94 which also covers health information95 and possibly genetic data,
93 See also A.W. Heringa, ‘International and National Legal Instruments, in: Genetic Dis-
crimination and Genetic Privacy in a Comparative Perspective’, in: J.H. Gerards, A.W.
Heringa and H.L. Janssen, supra (footnote 2), p. 44/45.
94 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the
free movement of such data, OJ L 281/31. The Directive provide a number of important
safeguards, including a duty to inform the individual (Articles 10 and 11), the individual’s
right of access to data (Article 12), the right to object (Article 14) and rules with respect
to confidentiality (Articles 16 and 17).
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as well as a (non-binding) Charter of Fundamental Rights which contains a general
prohibition of discrimination (including disability discrimination),96 no initiatives
have been introduced thus far that envisage supranational regulation of the use
of genetic information by insurers or employers. An important question in this
regard is whether it would be legally possible to introduce such regulation in the
future. A number of legal bases for such regulation might be found in the EC
Treaty, but it is highly questionable whether they will prove to be sufficient.
An interesting legal basis for the introduction of non-discrimination legislation
pertaining to genetic information could be found in Article 13 EC-Treaty. On the
basis of this Article, the Council of Ministers of the EU may take action against
discrimination on any of the grounds mentioned in Article 13 by means of
Directives. Although Article 13 itself does not mention ‘genetic information’ or
‘health’ as a prohibited ground, a hypothetical possibility is that discrimination
on grounds of genetic makeup is covered by the wider ground of (future) disability.
Such a wide interpretation should not be expected too easily, however, as the
European Court of Justice has thus far shown restraint both in its interpretation
of the grounds contained in Article 13 and in its acceptance of ‘new’ grounds of
discrimination.97 Furthermore, as far as it is possible to show a (statistical) relation
95 As far as the use of genetic information in health care is concerned, the Directive provides
for an exception if “the processing of the data is required for the purpose of preventive
medicine, medical diagnosis, the provision of care or treatment or the management of
health-care services, and where those data are processed by a health professional subject
under national law or rules established by national competent bodies to the obligation of
professional secrecy or by another person also subject to an equivalent obligation of
secrecy” (Article 8 (3)).
96 See Article 20 which stipulates that everyone is equal before the law and Article 21 which
prohibits discrimination on grounds such as disability and genetic features. With respect
to privacy, the Charter covers the protection of private life (Article 7) and the protection
of personal data (Article 8).
97 See for the ECJ’s approach for example the refusal of recognition of a prohibition of
discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation in P v. S and Cornwall City Council,
Case C-13/94, [1996] ECR I-2143, par. 18-22 andGrant v. South West Trains, Case C-249/
96, [1998] ECR I-621. See also Sonia Chacón Navas v. Spain, Case C-13/05, judgment
of 11 July 2006, not yet published, in which the ECJ gave an interpretation of the notion
of ‘disability’ as laid down in the Employment Equality Directive which specifies a general
framework for the prohibition of discrimination on the ground of disability (Council
Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000, OJ 2000 L 303/16). The ECJ paid attention
to the question whether the ground of ‘sickness’ should be deemed to be covered by the
notion of ‘disability’, or, if not, if it should be added to the prohibited grounds of discrimi-
nation mentioned in the Directive. The ECJ did not want to provide such a wide inter-
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between genetic discrimination and grounds such as sex, race and ethnicity, genetic
discrimination might be combated by application of the concept of indirect dis-
crimination.98 To that extent, relatively effective protection is offered at the supra-
national level indeed. Thus far, only the regulation of disability-, life- and health
insurance was exclusively dealt with by the member states, although the Gender
Goods and Services Directive contains provisions with respect to the use of sex
as an actuarial factor in insurance.99
It is not entirely clear though, whether the European Union institutions would have
the competence to enact regulations in the field of insurance and employment law
with the aim to harmonize genetic testing and the use of genetic information.
Article 152 EC-Treaty potentially seems to create a legal basis for the regulation
of access to health care and could thus constitute a platform for regulative action.
So far, however, this has not taken place. This reluctance could be explained from
the perspective of national differences in the fundamentals of insurance and
employment regulation in the member states. These differences result in a need
for specific, well-tailored legislation on the national level, which may well explain
a more reserved attitude by the EU in introducing harmonising regulations. More-
over, it is important to note that the issue of the protection of genetic information
does not exclusively and specifically affect the area of health care, but that it is
also relevant in other fields where it is much less clear how far the competence
of the EU stretches.
Thus, Article 13 of the EU Treaty would presently seem provide the most solid
basis for legislation at the supranational level, even though it is far from certain
if this provision really leaves room for the inclusion of grounds that are currently
not explicitly mentioned. Even if this Article was used as a legal basis, however,
pretation, however, limiting the prohibition of discrimination to long-term impairments
affecting the possibility to engage in professional life.
98 See the Employment Equality Directive which specifies a general framework for the
prohibition of discrimination on the ground of disability (Council Directive 2000/78/EC,
supra (footnote 97). In the same year the Race Equality Directive was adopted, which
covers the grounds of race and ethnic origin (Council Directive 2000/43/EC, OJ 2000 L
180/22). It may be noted, however, that the material scope of these Directives is limited
– with regard to disability, for example, only employment and employment-related matters
are covered. The Race Equality Directive has a somewhat wider scope, also covering social
security and social advantages – to all probability, its coverage thereby also extends to
the domain of health care and may thereby be of relevance to discrimination which is based
on health information and which disproportionately affects a specific racial or ethnic group.
99 See Council Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 December on equal treatment of men and women
in the supply of goods and services, OJ 2004 L 373.
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difficult questions would arise with regard to the European principle of subsidiarity,
which means that regulation on the supranational level is only called for if the
member states are not able to regulate the matter as effectively and fruitfully.100
This is particularly true, since it is clear that most member states are already in
a process of adopting regulatory measures in this area, which are specifically
geared to their national legal systems and which fit in well with the fundamentals
of their systems of health regulation. Comprehensive, uniform and exclusive
regulation at EU-level could harm local traditions with regard to employment and
insurance regulation. Nevertheless, a lack of uniformity could evidently result in
an unworkable patchwork of protection.
4.3.3 United States
In the last decade, many of the American states have introduced specific genetics
legislation, restricting the access to and use of genetic and other (predictive) health
information by employers and insurers. Although a high level of protection might
thus seems to be guaranteed, academic commentators and federal legislators have
adopted a critical attitude towards the current situation. A particular point of
criticism concerns the wide variation in scope and contents of the state legislative
measures. Some legislation starts from a source-based definition of genetic informa-
tion, other legislation shows a content-based definition, and even other legislation
covers all personal health information, including non-genetic information. The
material scope also varies, ranging from coverage of all types of employment and
insurance (including life insurance) to coverage of only a few specified types of
health insurance.101 The result is a patchwork of protection which is considered
to offer incomplete and unequal protection and which results in practical burdens
for insurance companies or employers operating in different states.102 Many com-
100 Even if there is a legal basis for the European Union to enact legislation, the question
if the matter can be better arranged by the national member states must still be answered
(see art. 5 EC-Treaty).
101 See e.g. K.L. Pickens, supra (footnote 83), p. 170ff, D. Gridley, ‘Genetic Testing under
the ADA: A Case for Protecting from Employment Discrimination’, 89 Georgetown Law
Journal 973 (2001), p. 980-981 and R.B. Lanman, ‘An Analysis of Current Law in Pro-
tecting Against Genetic Discrimination in Health Insurance and Employment’, Report to
the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health and Society, May 2005, <www4.
od.nih.gov/oba/sacghs/reports/legal_analysis_May2005.pdf> (last accessed 23 August 2006),
p. 11/12.
102 Cf. S. Burris and L.O. Gostin, ‘Genetic Screening from a Public Health Perspective: Some
Lessons from the HIV Experience’, in: M.A. Rothstein (ed.), Genetic Secrets. Protecting
Privacy and Confidentiality in the Genetic Era, New Haven/London: Yale University Press
1997, p. 151, J.G. Kodge and K.G. Gostin, ‘Challenging Themes in American Health
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mentators therefore favour the introduction of federal legislation, which is a plea
that is supported by a relatively large number of Congress members.103 The fact
that a variety of bills have been introduced in Congress during the last ten years
bears clear witness to the perceived need for federal legislation.
Still, the issue of federal legislation is controversial, which finds clear ex-
pression in the fact that none of the bills introduced since 1995 have been adopted
thus far. Next to political reasons,104 an explanation for this may be found in
the limited powers of Congress to introduce legislation in the relevant area. The
division of competence between the US government and the states is at least as
complex and sensitive as it is in the European Union.105 Insurance matters are
traditionally left to the states and will only be regulated on the federal level if
Congress considers state regulation inadequate.106 Federal competence to regulate
employment will only be established if interstate commerce is hampered by the
diversity of state legislation,107 or if federal regulation is necessary to combat
persistent and invidious genetic discrimination in the states.108 Current federal
Information Privacy and the Public’s Health: Historical and Modern Assessments’, 32
Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 670 (2004), p. 671 and R.B. Lanman, supra (footnote
101), p. 12.
103 E.g. J. Chorpening, ‘Genetic Disability: A Modest Proposal to Modify the ADA to Protect
Against Some Forms of Genetic Discrimination’, 82 North Carolina Law Review 1441
(2004), p. 1467 and and J.A. Colby, supra (footnote 6), p. 466.
104 Cf. A. Silvers and M.A. Stein, supra (footnote 19), p. 1375, explaining that Republicans
in the House of Representatives have been very reluctant to support earlier bills. The limited
political support may be due to rather strong lobbies of insurers and employers, who
strongly oppose any restrictions of access to relevant individual information; cf. J.A. Colby,
supra (footnote 6), p. 468 (footnote 229).
105 The federal government is entitled to exercise only those powers which are granted
expressly and exhaustively to it by the American Constitution. See the Tenth Amendment
to the Constitution, but also Section 1 of Article I. In the course of time, the reach of the
powers of the federal government has been broadened by means of extensive interpretation
of the Constitution. Cf. further L.H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law. Volume One,
Third. Ed., New York: Foundation Press 2000, p. 789 and 801 ff.
106 See theMcCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945 (15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15). Cf. C.A. Peterson, ‘New
Twist to an Old Injustice: Genetic Discrimination and Medicare Reform’, 36 Idaho Law
Review 2000, p. 357 and M.A. Rothstein, supra (footnote 15), p. 456.
107 Under the Commerce Clause, the U.S. Congress must show that the regulated activities
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce or form an essential part of a larger
regulation of economic activity. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, at 244 (1997).
108 See Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as interpreted by the Supreme Court in cases
such as City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) and Kimel v. Board of Regents,
528 U.S. 62 (2000). It may be derived from these cases that federal legislation is only
acceptable if there is reason to believe that there really is a situation of unconstitutional
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bills are all based on the latter argument, stating that genetic discrimination can
only be effectively prevented by the introduction of nationwide legislation.109
It is difficult to predict whether this argument will be accepted by the federal
courts, especially since federal age non-discrimination legislation, which was based
on a similar line of reasoning, was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court
in 1997 because it was not sufficiently clear that the legislation responded to a
‘significant pattern of unconstitutional discrimination’.110 It is questionable if
such a pattern of discrimination can (already) be considered to exist with respect
to genetic information, since, as yet, scientific evidence does not indicate the actual
existence of invidious and widespread genetic discrimination. As a constitutional
basis for federal legislation, the argument of remedying genetic discrimination
would thus seem to be rather weak.111 It is therefore not unimaginable that consti-
tutional obstacles will stand in the way of federal regulation, even if this would
end the situation of fragmentary state legislation.112
discrimination in the states that should be prevented or responded to on the federal level
(528 U.S., at 91).
109 See e.g. S. 306 (Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2005), introduced by the
109th Congress, § 2 (4).
110 The finding of a situation of unconstitutional discrimination strongly depends on the chosen
standard of review. With respect to age discrimination, for instance, minimal scrutiny is
exercised (see Kimel, 521 U.S., at 83 and cf.Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia,
427 U.S. 307, at 312/313). Discrimination is then only considered unconstitutional if it
is patently arbitrary (cf. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960)). A stricter test is applied
in cases of race and gender discrimination, which are considered ‘suspect’ and therefore
less easily justifiable (see further J.H. Gerards, Judicial Review in Equal Treatment Cases,
Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff 2005, p. 465ff). It can be derived from this that congres-
sional action is practically only allowed if there is clear evidence of a significant pattern
of patently arbitrary discrimination in the states, or if it is shown that there is widespread
discrimination based on a highly suspect ground which would give rise to intermediate
or even strict scrutiny. In the latter case, Congress would need to point to a history of
purposeful discrimination in the states which reflects prejudice and antipathy against a
vulnerable and isolated group (see Kimel, 521 U.S., at 83). See also A. Silvers and M.A.
Stein, supra (footnote 19), p. 1376.
111 Although it is sometimes argued that genetic information should be seen as a suspect
category of information, which would thus constitute a sufficient reason to introduce
remedying legislation. Cf. e.g. S. Mezoff, supra (footnote 10), p. 352.
112 The interest of interstate commerce might be regarded as an alternative basis of federal
competence. Thus far, however, this argument has not been used in the federal bills.
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4.4 Regulative possibilities
4.4.1 Introduction
Once the decision has been made to regulate the use and the collection of genetic
or other (predictive) health information on a certain level, it must be decided which
regulatory instruments are suitable to achieve the aim of adequate protection of
individual interests without overly affecting other relevant interests, such as valid
business interests or the interest of the protection of the health of employees. The
choice of instruments depends on the desired level of protection to be given to
predictive health information and on the question whether existing legislation will
be adapted or whether specific and new measures are introduced. Indeed, a wide
range of regulatory instruments is available, all having their particular strengths
and weaknesses. In this section, we will discuss the various choices made in the
United States and in Europe and we will provide some insight in their advantages
and disadvantages.
4.4.2 Europe
Constitutional arrangements
In the German Constitution, a general prohibition of discrimination and protection
of the human personality and human dignity exists.113 The German Federal Con-
stitutional Court has often interpreted the constitutional provisions into practicable
and enforceable rights. The provisions mentioned are broad enough to encompass
protection of genetic information, but this interpretation has not yet emerged in
the case law of the Federal Constitutional Court.114 Greece revised its Constitu-
tion by including protection for the ‘genetic identity’ and by strengthening the
113 See Art. 1 and 2 of the German Constitution for the right to human dignity and the right
to personal development; see Art. 3 for the prohibition of discrimination.
114 Recently a young teacher in Germany was refused a permanent job on the grounds that
members of her family have Huntington’sdisease and she is therefore at risk of developing
the disease herself. The risk was identified on basis of a medical examination that all
applicants to the German civil service, including teachers, have to undergo. Under German
employment law, government authorities can reject candidates for the civil service on the
grounds of ill health to minimise absenteeism and save money.The occupational physician
who carried out the medical check reported that the teacher was fit to perform her job but
said that there was a ‘higher risk’ of future absenteeism because of her family medical
history. According to the court decision, the woman was denied for the position on incorrect
grounds (see Verwaltungsgericht Darmstadt VG Darmstadt: Az.: 1 E 470/04 (3) and see
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of 28 June 2004, Nr. 147, p. 30).
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protection of personal data.115 The Swiss Constitution encompasses protection
of human genetic material and data since 2002.116 The Greek and Swiss constitu-
tional provisions provide protection which is oriented towards genetic privacy
approach on a more abstract level. The Swiss Constitution explicitly mentions
the right to informed consent. The Greek approach aims to include a concept of
‘genetic identity’. Protection, enforcement and exceptions have to be arranged by
statutory law. Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom have no constitutional provisions explicitly referring to genetic informa-
tion or to a ‘genetic identity’.
Statutory legislation
Constitutional provisions focusing on protection of genetic information may have
a politically desirable effect, namely that the protection of genetic information
may, as an answer to growing anxiety in a legal system, become more visible and
create popular support for initiatives. Constitutional provisions have a strong
fundamental value and may serve as an expression of social disapproval of non-
medical use of genetic information. But it is questionable if it is sufficient to rely
only on this regulative instrument, since the greatest threat of infringements will
not be caused by state authorities, but by private parties such as employers and
private insurers. Statutory legislation which aims directly at private actors may
be necessary in order to regulate such horizontal relationships. Specific regulation
at the statutory level has the advantage of creating clarity and enforceability.
Looking at the state of affairs in European legal systems, it may be carefully
115 The revision took place in 2001; cf. Article 5 of the Greek Constitution. The newly added
section in Article 5 reads as follows: “All persons are entitled to the protection of their
health and their genetic identity. Matters relating to the protection of every person against
biomedical interventions shall be specified by law”; see M. Canellopoulou-Bottis, ‘The
implementation of Directive 95/46/EC in Greece’, European Journal of Health Law 2002,
p. 211. Article 9A of the Greek Constitution was amended and protects the personal data:
“All persons have the right to be protected from the collection, processing and use, especial-
ly by electronic means, of their personal data, as specified by law. The protection of
personal data is ensured by an independent authority, which is established and operates
as specified by law”.
116 Art. 119 of the Swiss Constitution stipulates: “(1) Persons shall be protected against the
abuse of medically assisted procreation and gene technology. (2) The Confederation shall
legislate on the use of human reproductive and genetic material. It shall ensure the pro-
tection of human dignity, of personality, and of family, and in particular it shall respect
the following principles: […] f. A person’s genetic material may only be analyzed,
registered or disclosed with the consent of that person, or if a statute so provides; g. Every
person shall have access to the data concerning his or her ancestry.” See <www.admin.ch/
ch/itl/rs/1/c101ENG.pdf> (last accessed 23 August 2006).
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concluded that the introduction of statutory regulation on genetic information seems
to be the main ambition of most states, probably because of its clarity and
enforceability. A sectoral approach, in which the collection, disclosure and use
of genetic information are laid down in specific regulations for the various relevant
areas in which genetic information may be of importance, can be noted in the
Austrian, Belgian, Dutch, French, Portuguese, Norwegian and Swiss legislation.
In these legal systems, the legislator has opted for ’protection on the spot’. Regula-
tion in these systems focuses directly on insurance and employment and has been
introduced in the relevant codes, either by amendment of existing provisions or
by insertion of new rules.
The Austrian,117 Belgian,118 Dutch,119 French120 and Swiss121 legislators
have provided for statutory law with regard to the protection of genetic information.
Section 67 of the Austria Gene Technology Act prohibits insurers and employers
from obtaining, requesting, accepting or in any other way using the results of
genetic analyses of employees, candidate employees, policyholders or insurance
applicants. This prohibition is of particular relevance to private insurers, as the
public insurance system already provides universal coverage with regard to health
insurance. The Austrian Insurance Contract Law was amended in 2000; the prohi-
bition of the use of genetic information by insurers as laid down in the Act
remained untouched.122 The amendment inserted moreover an exhaustive list
of the ways in which insurers may obtain personal health data.123 For employers,
no specific legal adjustments have taken place; here the Gene Technology Act
still applies. With regard to both insurance and employment, the Federal Personal
Data Protection Act applies as well. The Belgian Law on terrestrial insurance
contracts (1992) prohibits the use of genetic testing that enables to predict the
future state of health. Applicants for insurance are thus prohibited from revealing
results of genetic testing to insurers and there is a prohibition on the use, process-
ing and transmission of pre-symptomatic genetic information in insurance. In 2003,
the Belgian federal parliament enacted a law prohibiting the use of predictive
117 Gentechnik Gesetz (Austrian Gene Technology Act); see <http://www.bmbwk.gv.at/
forschung/recht/gentechnik/gtg.xmll>.
118 See Landverzekeringovereenkomst, Law of 25 June 1992, Belgian Official Journal of 20
August 1992; see also <www.law.kuleuven.ac.be/icri> (last accessed 23 August 2006).
119 See Wet Medische keuringen (Dutch Act on Medical Examinations) 1998, Staatsblad
(Official Gazette) 1997, 365; see <www.overheid.nl> (last accessed 23 August 2006).
120 See below.
121 See below.
122 See Vertragsversicherungsgesetz 1958, Article 11.
123 Vertragsversicherungsgesetz 1958, Article 11 (2) 1-5.
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genetic testing (and testing on HIV) for work related purposes as a principle; the
Crown may adopt measures that deviate from this principle.124 A bill (2002)
has been launched in Belgium on a prohibition of discrimination on the basis of
genetic characteristics with regard to insurance and employment.125
In France, sectoral legislation was introduced in 2002.126 The Civil Code,127
the Insurance Code,128 the Criminal Code129 and the Code on Labour Law130
have been amended and now offer protection for genetic information. The Civil
Code stipulates that the genetic study of an individual’s characteristics can only
be carried out for medical purposes or for scientific research.
The German Ministry of Justice currently prepares a draft with regard to genetic
testing that should limit the use of genetic information by insurers.131 No specific
statutory legislation is in place here yet.
Likewise, the Greek legislator has not yet drafted sectoral legislation; compli-
ance with the prohibition of processing and the use of genetic information is
supposed to be covered by Law 2472/97 which protects sensitive health data and
inherently genetic information. In the Netherlands, statutory legislation was enacted
in the Medical Examinations Act, which regulates medical examinations for the
purpose of employment (also in public service), pension- and life-insurance and
disability insurance related to employment.132 This act encompasses the protection
of privacy: no questions may be asked, if these questions or medical examinations
124 See Loi relative aux examens médicaux dans le cadre des relations de travail (1), 28
January 2003 (Service Public Fédéral Emploi, Travail et Concertation Sociale).
125 The Belgian Bill on a prohibition of discrimination on the basis of genetic traits has not
entered into force yet (see Voorstel tot instelling van een verbod op discriminatie op grond
van genetische kenmerken, 11 September 2002, <www.dekamer.be/FLWB/PDF/50/2018/
50K2018001.pdf> (last accessed 23 August 2006).
126 See for an overview F. Ewald, The philosophical aspects of genetic testing: the example
of insurance, Working Paper in Report of the European Group on Ethics on new Techno-
logies: Genetic Text in the Workplace, Proceedings of the Round Table Debate, held in
Brussels on 6 March 2002.
127 Art. 16-10 of the Civil Code, see Law no. 94-653 (1994) updating the Civil Code; see
also the Ethics Report of the Comité Consultatif National d’Éthique pour les sciences de
la vie et de la santé, 30 October 1995.
128 Art. L 133-1, Code des Assurances, updated by law 2002-2)03 (Journal Officiel 5 March
2002, see <www.legifrance.gouv.fr> (last accessed 23 August 2006).
129 Art. 226-26 of the Criminal Code states that the use of information about an individual
which has been obtained by studying his genetic characteristics other than for medical
or scientific purposes is punishable with one year imprisonment or a fine of C= 15.000.
130 Code du Travail, L 122-45, Art. 7.
131 Bill on Genetische Untersuchungen beim Menschen, or ‘Gendiagnostikgesetz’ (bill of 15
October 2004).
132 See Dutch Act on Medical Examinations, Art. 1 (a).
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lead to a disproportional infringement in the private sphere of the individual.133
The act specifies the circumstances under which contractual freedom will be set
aside.134 Some cases where the interest of the individual does not outweigh the
expected risks – such as the situation in which an examination on whether some-
body is a carrier of a severe, untreatable disease (in the future), or the confrontation
of the individual with knowledge about his future health perspective – are con-
sidered as disproportional infringements.135 The Norwegian Gene Technology
Act and the Act relating to the application of biotechnology in medicine both apply
to the use of genetic information.136 Genetic testing may only be carried out
for medical purposes. Insurers and employers cannot inquire after genetic informa-
tion about genetic testing in the past.137 The Portuguese legislator implemented
the EU-Directive 95/46/EC and added to the list of data disclosure of which is
prohibited ‘genetic data’.138 In 2004, the Swiss Act on genetic research on
humans came in force.139 This Act arranges for a financial ceiling; under a certain
amount no predictive genetic testing can be asked for by insurers.140 Finally,
the United Kingdom has not enacted sectoral legislation so far, but this is currently
being discussed.
Self-regulation
Although the introduction of statutory legislation has a lot of advantages, it suffers
from inflexibility (albeit in a different degree than constitutional provision). The
democratic processes which lead to statutory legislation are usually time-consuming
133 Art. 3 (1) of the Act on Medical Examinations.
134 J.K.M. Gevers, De Wet medische keuringen in het perspectief van mensenrechten, NJCM-
Bulletin 1999, p. 448.
135 J.K.M. Gevers, A.C. Hendriks et al., supra (footnote 1), p. 99.
136 Act No. 56 of 5 August 1994; this law was updated at 30 June 1995, 16 May 1997 and
27 March 1998. EU-Directive 95/46/EC was implemented in Norwegian law as well;
Norway was obliged to do so since it is a member of the EEA agreement that determines
that the Directive has binding force on the EEA-members.
137 T. McGleenan and U. Wiesing, ‘Insurance and Genetics: European Policy Options’,
European Journal of Health Law 2000, p. 377.
138 Article 7 of Act 67/98 of 26 October 2001 regulates the Protection of Personal Information,
in which the EU-Directive was implemented. Article 7 of the Act stipulates: “The pro-
cessing of personal data revealing […] data concerning health or sex life, including genetic
data, shall be prohibited.”
139 Bundesgesetz über genetische Untersuchungen beim Menschen, Act of 8 October 2004,
see <www.admin.ch/ch/d/ff/2004/5483.pdf> (last accessed 23 August 2006). The act
determines the circumstances under which insurers and employers may ask for genetic
testing (articles 26 and 27 of the Act).
140 See Article 27 (1) d of the Act.
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and progress often depends on a long process of building up political support.
It is difficult to adapt statutory legislation to new scientific and social develop-
ments, which might be problematic in a fast-evolving area like that of genomics.
Soft law instruments such as self-regulation, the imposition of temporary moratoria
and the publication of guidelines would seem to meet the need for flexibility and
adaptability better than statutory legislation does. On the other hand, the protection
offered by those instruments is weaker and thus less well enforceable.141 Compli-
ance with moratoria, for example, is mostly provided for by the insurance industry
itself, and moratoria may be changed or abolished after a certain period of time.
No research has been conducted with regard to the effectiveness of moratoria,
but it may be expected that they are rather effective under the condition that the
insurance has a strong interest in avoiding free-rider behaviour that might disturb
regular competitive relationships. Still, the regulation of genetics has thus far
exclusively been left to self-regulation by the market (within certain limits) in a
number of member states. In the United Kingdom, for example, insurance com-
panies have agreed with the government on a moratorium which will extend the
existing voluntary moratorium on insurers’ use of predictive test results by five
years to 1 November 2011.142 As a result, insurance customers will not be
required to disclose the results of genetic tests for insurance policies up to
£ 500.000 of life insurance, or £ 300.000 for critical illness insurance or paying
annual benefits of £ 30.000 for income protection insurance. A moratorium was
accepted in Germany as well and has been validated until 2011 for policies over
C= 250.000.143 The Netherlands allows a similar construction, determining ceilings
141 The moratorium in the United Kingdom has been criticised for this reason: not all insurance
companies are members of the Association who concluded the concordat; 97% of the
insurance industry is a member. See Gene Watch UK, ‘Genetic discrimination by insurers
and employers: still looming on the horizon. An update on the use of genetic test results
by employers and insurers’, February 2006, see http://www.genewatch.org/uploads/
f03c6d66a9b354535738483c1c3d49e4/GeneticTestingUpdate2006.pdf.
142 Concordat and Moratorium on Genetics and Insurance, HM Government and Association
of British Insurers, March 2005. The concordat will be reviewed in 2008. Most importantly,
it stipulates that insurers should not treat customers who have adverse predictive genetic
test result less favourably than others, without a reasonable justification. Technical, clinical
and actuarial relevance of test results should be subject to independent supervision and
customers should receive clear explanation of their rights. Moreover, insurers and customers
should have equal access to information that is material and relevant for insurance under-
writing, taking into account exceptions as provided for in the concordat.
143 Press release of the Gesamtverband der Deutschen Versicherungswirtschaft, 7 October
2004.
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indicating a restriction of the use of genetic tests.144 Under that ceiling it is no
longer the industry but the legislator that determines the ceiling.145 In Belgian,
Norwegian and Austrian legislation there is no space left for self-regulation or
for co-regulation since they explicitly prohibit the use of genetic testing under
any circumstance in insurance or employment.
4.4.3 United States
For the United States it is relatively clear that existing legislation offers insufficient
protection against the misuse of predictive health information by non-medical
actors. There is currently no general federal legislation in place that expressly and
adequately protects individual rights in the relevant area. The US Constitution
offers protection only against state action, not against discrimination by private
employers or insurers. To some extent this gap is filled by the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 and the Americans with Disabilities Act, but these Acts do not expressly
refer to discrimination based on genetic or personal health information.146 The
interpretation thus far given to both Acts by the Supreme Court does not seem
to leave much room for protection against such discrimination either.147
This might seem different for specific health insurance legislation. Such
legislation as the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),148 the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)149 and the Genetic
144 The Dutch Medical Examinations Act has set limits for disability insurance (C= 30.901 for
the first year of disability benefits and C= 21.267 for consecutive years) and for life-insurance
(C= 159.505). See Art. 5 (2) of the Act.
145 The Dutch Act on Medical Examinations also prescribes stakeholders such as representative
employers’ organisations and employers, consumers, patients and insurers to enter into
agreements by self-regulation on the further application of the legal norms that are laid
down in the Act and on the establishment of an independent commission where complaints
can be filed. Should the parties not be able to reach an agreement, the legislature will take
over again after three years. See art. 9 and 14 of the Act.
146 For a recent overview of the protection offered by the ADA and the Civil Rights Act 1964
against genetic discrimination and violations of genetic privacy, see J.H. Gerards, supra
(footnote 84), p. 153ff and 168ff. Cf. also S. Mezoff, supra (footnote 10) and J. Chorpe-
ning, supra (footnote 105), p. 1451ff.
147 Cf. e.g. S. Mezoff, supra (footnote 10), p. 354.
148 See 29 U.S.C. Chapter 18 (as amended by HIPAA); see in particular § 1140.
149 Pub. L. 104-191. The amendments made by HIPAA are included in ERISA; see 29 U.S.C.
Chapter 18. Highly relevant is also a regulation pertaining to privacy and confidentiality
of health information (not limited to genetic information!) that has been adopted on basis
of HIPAA: the Privacy Regulation of 2001 (45 C.F.R. Part 160, 162 and 164 (2004)). For
an overview and critique see M.C. Pollio, ‘The Inadequacy of HIPAA’s Privacy Rule:
The Plain Language Notice of Privacy Practices and Patient Understanding’, 60 New York
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Executive Order150 contain various clauses safeguarding genetic privacy and
non-discrimination interests.151 Most commentators agree, however, that this
protection is fragmentary and insufficient and that it will be difficult to answer
to the risks posed by the availability of predictive personal health information by
amending existing legislation alone.152
For this reason it is often stressed that new, specific legislation is needed to
fill up existing gaps. The introduction of a general non-discrimination or privacy
clause in the Constitution or in a general non-discrimination act such as the Civil
Rights Act does not seem to be regarded as a serious option.153 Instead, both
state legislation and federal legislative proposals focus on the inclusion of non-dis-
crimination and privacy clauses in sectoral legislation, such as legislation aiming
at the health insurance industry or employers in general. Such an approach is
considered desirable to meet the different demands and needs of each field and
to strike an appropriate balance between the interests involved.154
In our study, we did not investigate all regulative instruments that the American
states have adopted to combat genetic discrimination, but it is evident that a wide
University Annual Survey of American Law 579 (2004).
150 Exec. Order No. 13145, 65 Fed. Reg. 6877 (2000); this Order only covers federal em-
ployees and does not have any binding force. See also the EEOC Policy Guidance on
Executive Order 13145, <www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/guidance-genetic.html> (last accessed
23 August 2006).
151 See further J.H. Gerards, supra (footnote 84), p. 171ff.
152 This criticism is widely held, particularly with respect to privacy and non-discrimination
protection in health insurance; see e.g. J.A. Colby, supra (footnote 6), p. 468, C.S. Diver
and J.M. Cohen, supra (footnote 13), p. 1450, J. Hustead and J. Goldman, supra (footnote
83), p. 292, K.L. Pickens, supra (footnote 83), p. 174 and N.E. Kass, supra (footnote 57),
p. 313. In the field of employment law, similar criticism has been leveled (in particular
by M.S. Dichter and S.E. Sutor, ‘The New Genetic Age: Who is ‘An Individual with a
Disability’? Do Our Genes make us Disabled Individuals under the ADA?’ 42 Villanova
Law Review 613 (1997), p. 626 and K.A. Steinforth, ‘Bringing your DNA to Work:
Employers’ Use of Genetic Testing Under the Americans with Disabilities Act’, 43 Arizona
Law Review 965 (2001), p. 969), although Gridley and Gostin have submitted that the
present legislation offers sufficient possibilities for the prevention of genetic discrimination;
see D. Gridley, supra (footnote 101), p. 998 and L. Gostin, supra (footnote 102), p. 143.
153 Such a proposal is only rarely made. See e.g. A. Silvers and M.A. Stein 2003, supra
(footnote 19), p. 382, proposing an amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to
include discrimination based on genetic identity.
154 Cf. M. Powers, supra (footnote 6), p. 371/372.
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range of instruments is used.155 The state governments seem to make little use
of two instruments that are commonly employed in the European states, i.e. the
introduction of moratoria and the setting of financial ceilings above which the
use of genetic information by insurers is allowed.156 An explanation for this may
be that both instruments have been severely criticised in American academic
literature and by specialists in the field of insurance. Moratoria are objected to
because of their absolute character (they constitute a complete prohibition on all
use of genetic information, albeit temporarily) and because of the fear that, once
a moratorium is imposed, it may be difficult to remove.157 Ceiling setting would
be a better solution from this perspective, but it is criticised for the fact that it
does not solve the problems related to the proper definition of genetic information.
Moreover, the method of ceiling setting would lead to an undesired need for price
adjustments.158 Finally, the industry has opposed the introduction of restrictive
measures or moratoria, even by means of self-regulation, as it would be difficult
to police such measures effectively against non-conforming insurers or employers.
This would be undesirable from the perspective of competition.159
Little serious consideration has further been given to solutions in the sphere
of reforming the American health insurance system into a more publicly organised
system based on solidarity.160 The same is true for the suggestion that a fund
could be created to subsidise insurers for accepting high risks against an affordable
155 The legislation would seem to show less variety than in Europe, however. At least in the
life insurance branch, no use is currently made of moratoria or ceiling setting. For a critical
overview of regulative possibilities see M.A. Rothstein, ‘Policy Recommendations’, in:
M.A. Rothstein, Genetics and Life Insurance. Medical Underwriting and Social Policy,
Cambridge, Mass./London: MIT Press 2004, p. 254ff.
156 For an explanation of the use of these instruments in Europe, see T. McGleenan and U.
Wiesing, supra (footnote 137), p. 374 and 375.
157 See M.A. Rothstein 2004, supra (footnote 155), p. 255.
158 Id., p. 257.
159 See R.H. Jerry II, ‘Antitrust Implications of Insurers’ Collaborative Standard Setting’, in:
M.A. Rothstein, Genetics and Life Insurance. Medical Underwriting and Social Policy,
Cambridge, Mass./London: MIT Press 2004, p. 214.
160 See E. Draper, supra (footnote 73), p. 318.
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rate.161 Both solutions would demand complete restructuring of the health insur-
ance market, which seems to be politically unfeasible at present.162
Instead, other solutions have been chosen. Most common are the introduction
of requirements of informed consent; restrictions on access to information; and
prohibitions of unfair use of genetic information.163 These solutions will be dis-
cussed in section 4.5.3 below.
4.5 Privacy or non-discrimination approach; or both?
4.5.1 Introduction
Several approaches can be adopted to prevent employers and insurers from collect-
ing, using and disclosing genetic and other predictive health information, regardless
of the regulatory instrument that is chosen. In the first place, it is possible to opt
for a privacy approach, which is specifically used to protect aspects of
informational privacy, confidentiality of information, and, as a concrete aspect
of the notion of self-determination, the right “not to know”. The choice for a
privacy approach would imply that employers and insurers or other actors are
explicitly prohibited from having access to genetic information and are prevented
from requiring and requesting individuals to undergo a genetic test and to learn
about the results. It may also mean that specific measures are introduced to safe-
guard the confidentiality of genetic information which has become available as
a result of medical examinations.
161 See e.g. M.M.R. Radetzki and N. Juth,Genes and Insurance (Ethical, Legal and Economic
Issues), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003, pp. 73-75. See also R.A. Epstein,
‘The Legal Regulation of Genetic Discrimination: Old Responses to New Technology’,
74 Boston University Law Review 1 (1994), p. 20/21.
162 See M.A. Rothstein, supra (footnote 15), p. 456, J. Chorpening, (footnote 103), p. 1471
and cf. T. McGleenan and U. Wiesing, supra (footnote 137), p. 371. Interestingly, however,
the American Academy of Actuaries has suggested to strengthen the safety nets of Medicare
and Medicaid to insure universal access to a minimum level of disability insurance and
long term care coverage (American Academy of Actuaries, The Use of Genetic Information
in Disability Income and Long-Term Care Insurance, Issue Brief Spring 2002, p. 9). Such
a system would surely, at least to some extent, diminish the risk of having no access to
important social goods because of genetic information, although it would not solve all
questions of informational privacy – after all, such information would still be required
in the private market supplementing the safety net.
163 For an overview see National Conference of State Legislatures 2003, <www.ncsl.org/
programs/health/genetics/ndislife.htm> (last accessed 23 August 2006).
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In the alternative, a non-discrimination approach can be chosen, not so much
to protect individuals from disclosure of genetic information, as well as to protect
them from the use of such information. This approach would imply that employers
and insurers are prevented from distinguishing between (candidate) employees
and potential insurance-takers on the basis of genetic information. By using this
approach, unjustified disadvantage based on unalterable personal characteristics
is prohibited.
Finally, it is possible to use both approaches in combination. Indeed, this
approach seems to be favoured in academic literature, as neither the privacy nor
the non-discrimination approach does provide adequate protection against misuse
of genetic and other types of predictive health information. The privacy approach
would not, after all, protect individuals against misuse of knowledge which an
insurer or employer may eventually acquire. The adoption of a non-discrimination
approach, on the other hand, does not in itself prevent non-medical actors from
collecting or acquiring personal health information. Even if he would not be
allowed to use such information, the interests of privacy and self-determination
might thus be seriously impaired.
In deciding about the regulative approach to be taken, it is therefore important
to guarantee that both the aspect of confidentiality and privacy and the aspect of
misuse are covered. It is interesting to investigate if current legislation in the US
and in Europe indeed offers such comprehensive protection, or, alternatively, starts
from either a privacy or a discrimination centred approach.
4.5.2 Europe
In European legal systems, genetic information is primarily protected by means
of privacy legislation and seems rather generous. The regulations cover not only
the confidentiality of sensitive health information, but also prohibit in a number
of legal systems the collection, use and processing of such information. It may
be argued that such an overall prohibition of access to genetic information in the
sphere of privacy comes close to a general prohibition on the use of genetic
information, offering strong indirect protection against genetic discrimination. But
there may be undesirable consequences of a total ban on the use of genetic infor-
mation in all circumstances. Interests of insurers cannot not taken on board, which
may well lead, as has been shown in a study on Belgium and Austria, to adverse
selection.164 Some European legal systems allow the use of genetic information.
164 See also H. Nys, I. Dreezen, I. Vinck and K. Dierickx, Genetic Testing. Patients’ rights,
insurance and employment. A survey of regulations in the European Union, European
Commission: Brussels 2002, p. 141.
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Once this is allowed, a prohibition of discrimination on the basis of genetic
information becomes more urgent. But so far, only the Swiss law refers explicitly
to the prohibition of discrimination.165 With regard to discrimination prohibitions
at EU-level, Art. 13 EC-Treaty may provide a sound basis for the development
of legal norms protecting against genetic discrimination. But Art. 13 contains a
limitative list of discrimination grounds, and genetic information is not one of
them. It may however find protection in an indirect manner, e.g. through the
prohibition of discrimination on the basis of race, ethnic origin or sex.
The choice for the protection of genetic information by privacy-oriented
regulations may be explained by the wish to grant individuals more power over
their genetic information by stressing the concept of informed consent.166 It is
not clear, however, whether this approach will offer sufficient protection. Especially
in situations where the individual gets involved in a relationship of dependence
– clearly visible in the underwriting process of an insurance policy or in under-
writing a contract with an employer – the concept of power over one’s own genetic
information may become relative. At the same time there are situations where it
is to the benefit of the individual to undergo a genetic test in an employment
relationship, for example where it concerns workplace conditions that may affect
the individuals’ health. A prohibition of discrimination may have added value here.
4.5.3 United States
American legislation generally shows a two-pronged approach towards protecting
individuals against misuse of genetic information.167 Firstly, legislation is in place
to safeguard individual medical privacy by controlling the disclosure of information
and by preventing insurers and employers from having easy access to private
information.168 To this end employers and insurers are, with some exceptions,
165 See Art. 4 of the Bundesgesetz über genetische Untersuchungen beim Menschen. The
Belgian Bill on a prohibition of discrimination on the basis of genetic traits has not entered
into force yet (see Voorstel tot instelling van een verbod op discriminatie op grond van
genetische kenmerken, 11 September 2002), <www.dekamer.be/FLWB/PDF/50/2018/
50K2018001.pdf> (last accessed 23 August 2006).
166 J.H. Gerards, ‘Conclusions’, in: Genetic Discrimination and Genetic Privacy in a Com-
parative Perspective, supra (footnote 2), p. 235/236.
167 Such an approach is also favoured by most commentators, who argue that either a pure
privacy-based model or a pure non-discrimination based model would offer insufficient
protection. See e.g. J. Chorpening, supra (footnote 103), p. 1469.
168 This is of particular interest for those employers that happen to possess medical information
about an employee, for instance because they also act as health insurance agents; see on
the confidentiality of medical and genetic data in particular S. 306 SE, § 206.
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prohibited from requesting or collecting genetic information and from requiring
individuals to undergo a genetic test and disclose the results.169 Such prohibitions
also diminish the risk for discrimination on the basis of genetic information. After
all, the opportunities for employers and insurers to make use of personal health
information are reduced by restricting the possibilities for having access to such
information. Still, the need is felt to reduce the possibility that employers or
insurers misuse any information they eventually acquire.170 Academic com-
mentators have therefore proposed that legislation should also contain restrictions
on the use of genetic information, which suggestion has been followed in several
bills introduced during the last decade.171 The most recent bills on the issue,
S. 306 SE and H.R. 1227, contain provisions that explicitly prohibit any employ-
ment practice that would disadvantage an employee or job applicant because of
his or her genetic information,172 or prohibit insurers from using genetic informa-
tion in determining an individual’s eligibility or in premium setting.173 It is then
not so much genetic discrimination that is prohibited (which would imply a
comparative element: the individual would need to show that he has been treated
differently from someone else), as well as the unjustifiable use of genetic informa-
tion. The result of this approach is a relatively light burden of proof for victims
of genetic discrimination, who only need to show that the employer or insurer
has used genetic information in taking a disadvantageous employment or insurance
decision.
169 With respect to insurance see in particular S. 306 SE, § 101(c)(1) and § 104(c). Interesting-
ly, this prohibition on the collection of genetic information is rather absolute: no room
is left for voluntary and informed disclosure by the individual insured or employee himself,
such as has been proposed by some commentators (see e.g. T. Sorell, ‘The Insurance
Market and Discriminatory Practices’, in: J. Burley and J. Harris, A Companion to Gen-
ethics, Malden: Blackwell 2002, p. 402 and R.J. Pokorski, supra (footnote 37), p. 103/104).
170 See A. Silvers and M.A. Stein 2003, supra (footnote 19), p. 378.
171 See J. Hustead and J. Goldman, supra (footnote 82), p. 287 and M.A. Rothstein 1997,
supra (footnote 15), p. 471. Recommendations to this effect are also made by ELSI (the
Ethical, Legal and Social Implications Working Group of the National Human Genome
Research Institute) (ELSI et al., Genetic Information and the Workplace: Implications for
Employment, Insurance and Privacy, 1996, <www.genome.gov/10001746> (last accessed
23 August 2006)) and by the US Department of Labor, in cooperation with the Department
of Health and Human Services, the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission and
the Department of Justice (Genetic Information and the Workplace, 1998, (www.genome.
gov/10001732> (last accessed 23 August 2006).
172 See S. 306 SE § 202(a).
173 See e.g. S. 306 SE § 101(a)(2) and (3) (no discrimination in group premiums based on
genetic information) and § 102(b) (prohibition on genetic information as a condition of
eligibility).
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4.6 Flexible of rigid approach; wide or narrow exceptions?
4.6.1 Introduction
If it has been decided that it is desirable to restrict the use and collection of genetic
information, it is necessary to consider how the relevant measures should be
designed. Such design will depend on the definition of genetic information (source-
based or content-based), the character of the measures (constitutional protection,
statutory regulation, self-regulation with or without moratoria, guidelines) and on
the choice for a privacy or for a non-discrimination approach (or a combination
of both). As argued before, genetics legislation moreover requires a complicated
balance of interests, which may have great influence on the final design of the
regulatory instruments. The balance that is struck between these interests may be
reflected by the introduction of restrictive measures providing for a number of
exceptions to accommodate for the legitimate interests of employers and insurers.
Such measures can be designed in a variety of ways. It is possible, for instance,
to introduce general, broadly formulated legislation, containing loosely defined
exceptions. The application of such provisions is then primarily left to administra-
tive bodies and to the courts, which will have to decide about their correct inter-
pretation. Such broadly defined provisions have the advantage of flexibility and
adaptability to new scientific insights and social developments. Alternatively, it
is possible to opt for carefully defined provisions and strictly formulated exception
clauses, which are less flexible in character, but provide for much legal certainty
and clarity, which is beneficial to both market actors and individuals.
Below, our findings with respect to the choices made in the legal systems under
study are described and discussed: do they adopt a flexible or rigid approach, and
do they allow for widely or narrowly formulated exceptions, and for which
reasons?
4.6.2 Europe
The approaches which have been taken in the regulatory arrangements in the
European states show a large variation. They may be strict, as in Austria, Belgium,
France and Norway, where the collection and use of genetic information for all
commercial purposes is prohibited. Austria and Belgium are even stricter than
this: their laws not only prohibit insurers from asking for genetic testing, but also
prohibit insurance takers from submitting favourable test results to get lower
premiums or more interesting insurance contracts. In addition, Austria and Belgium
have not formulated exceptions in their legislation. A more flexible approach can
be found in the legislation in the Netherlands. Section 5 (2) of the Medical Ex-
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aminations Act in principle prohibits medical checks connected to the conclusion
of insurance contracts. It provides that no such medical test shall involve question-
ing the applicant’s blood relatives – not even if the illness has already manifested
itself or the blood relative has died from it – or, unless the condition is manifest,
the applicant himself about hereditary conditions, or about genetic tests undergone
by the applicant or his blood relatives. But when the sum insured exceeds financial
enquiry limits, this information can be asked for.174 The evaluation of the Act
identified two problems relating to this provision.175 First, a rather innocent here-
ditary disease does not have to be announced if the knowledge results from former
examinations. However, it has to be announced if the carrier knows about the
disease from other sources. Secondly, article 5 refers to ‘serious and untreatable
diseases’ in art. 3 of the Act. Moreover, it refers to diseases that are not yet
manifest. There is no exhaustive list of serious and untreatable diseases, and it
is not clear when exactly a disease becomes manifest. The United Kingdom and
German legislatures have not regulated the protection of genetic information at
any level yet. The discussions in the United Kingdom about forthcoming legis-
lation, however, do not give the impression that a strict approach will be chosen.
Both legal systems seem to rely on protection by the courts (especially Germany)
and on codes of good practice (see the aforementioned concordat of the Association
of British Insurers).
With respect to employment, exception clauses do exist in many states. In
particular, employers are often allowed to request genetic information from the
individual (directly or through a medical practitioner), provided that such informa-
tion is necessary for or directly related to the employee’s professional activities.
In the Netherlands, medical examinations for the appointment of a job have to
serve the medical requirements of the particular job.176
174 The following limits were determined: disability insurance C= 30.901 for the first year of
disability benefits and C= 21.267 for consecutive years and life insurance C= 159.505. See
Art. 5 (2) of the Act.
175 M. Westerveld and M. Aerts, ‘Nieuwe regels voor het verzekeringskeuren: Evaluatie van
drie jaar wetstoepassing’, Nederlands Juristenblad 2002, p. 118-126.
176 If medical information is necessary, the following conditions apply to the examination:
1) the medical requirements and the execution of the examination must be described before
the selection procedure starts; 2) at the start of the selection procedure, the applicants have
to be informed about the medical requirements and about the medical examination; the
examination has to be performed at the end of the selection procedure, when the candidate
is chosen for the job if he is medically eligible and 4) no one is allowed to get information
from third parties such as the family doctor or the former employer about the health
condition of an applicant without the consent of the applicant. See art. 4 (1) of the Act.
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Flexible laws have the advantage of leaving more room for (judicial) interpretation.
This can be considered an asset since genetic information is still a developing
concept and judicial interpretation may accommodate for future developments.
The disadvantage of such formulations is that they can create legal uncertainty
until the moment of application for individuals, insurers and employers as to the
exact consequences of access to and use of genetic information. There seems to
exist consensus about the point of view that the health of the individual and access
to health protection prevails over other purposes that can be served by genetic
information. In some legal systems there is explicit room for exceptions, albeit
that the exception must meet the demands of proportionality and necessity. For
example, ceilings of insurance sums determine the extent to which individuals
should have access to health insurance or to life insurance.
An absolute prohibition may at first sight be most protective for individuals, but
not take sufficient account of the interests of the insurance industry. A ban could
expose the insurers to the danger of adverse selection and selective withdrawal
which, if experienced on a large scale, could harm the viability of the industry.
Early reviews of the operation of the Austrian legislation suggest for instance that
there is a divergence between the informal practice of insurance and the strong
prohibitions in the law.177 Here, the attraction of a ceiling system may become
clear: it reduces the effects of adverse selection by permitting the insured to seek
a bargain or to transfer risks but only within well-defined financial limits. Mora-
toria and self-regulation are not sufficient in themselves, especially when a sanction
system is lacking. They were and have been used as a response of the insurance
industry because there are very few relevant and accurate predictive genetic tests
available.
4.6.3 United States
The present US legislation that is relevant to genetic non-discrimination and privacy
interests is, over all, characterised by rather wide and flexible exemptions. Both
177 H. Nys, I. Dreezen, I. Vinck and K. Dierickx, supra (footnote 163), p. 18. Inquiries made
with applicants to the private insurance companies indicate that the insurer cannot force
applicants to have genetic tests, and will therefore not pay for such tests. However, those
at risk and therefore already on a higher premium often undergo tests at their own expense
and some applicants have had their premium reduced as a consequence of negative test
results. The existence of a law prohibiting insurers from using genetic test results does
not necessarily prevent an applicant for insurance from using that information at his own
advantage. See also G. Hauser and A. Jenisch, ‘Laws regarding insurance companies’,
in Journal of Medical Genetics 1998, p. 526.
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the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Civil Rights Act of 1964
contain broadly formulated exception clauses which allow, for example, for the
use of protected information if the information discloses an ‘inability to perform
essential job-functions’.178 In the course of time these clauses have become some-
what less flexible and open as a result of interpretation and refinement by the
American courts. It is questionable, however, if this has led to more adequate
protection of the right to privacy and non-discrimination, as the federal courts have
applied the relevant clauses of the ADA often (though not always) in favour of
employers.179 In addition, it is doubtful if a genetic predisposition to a disease
or disorder would be considered a disability under the ADA at all.180
Possibly in reaction to the judicial interpretation of both the scope and the ex-
ception clauses of the ADA, the genetic information bills presently under debate
in Congress contain much more narrowly formulated exception clauses.181 The
178 See for a discussion of these and other exception clauses J.H. Gerards, supra (footnote
84), p. 160ff. See specifically on the ADA also B. Kauffman, ‘Genetic Discrimination
in the Workplace. An Overview of Existing Protections’, 30 Loyola University of Chicago
Law Journal 393 (1999), p. 415, D. Gridley, supra (footnote 152) and K.A. Steinforth,
supra (footnote 152).
179 Some courts have accepted, for instance, that screening out of (potentially!) disabled
workers may be necessary to improve employee efficiency and productivity. A negative
employment decision may be justified on this basis. See e.g. Milton v. Scrivner, 53 F.3d
1118, at 1121; see also K.A. Steinforth, supra (footnote 152), p. 983. Other commentators
conclude, however, on the basis of other case-law that purely economic or financial
considerations cannot be held sufficient justifications under the ADA; e.g. L. Gostin, supra
(footnote 102), p. 134 and D. Gridley, supra (footnote 152), p. 995. Interesting is further
that the courts have allowed employers under the ADA to require a comprehensive medical
examination, including genetic testing, and even to condition the job offer on the results
of such examination (Norman Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, 135 F.3d 1260
(9th Cir. 1998), at 1273). Critical on this case law are D. Gridley, supra (footnote 152),
p. 998 and S.M. Suter, supra (footnote 11), p. 728.
180 For an overview of the case law see J.H. Gerards, supra (footnote 84), p. 154ff and R.B.
Lanman, supra (footnote 101), p. 13ff.
181 With respect to insurance see e.g. S. 306 SE, § 101(c)(2) and § 104(c)(2) and (3). With
respect to employment the bill only contains exceptions regarding the acquisition of genetic
information; see in particular S. 306 SE, § 202(b)(1)-(5). The prohibition on the use of
genetic information in employment decisions seems to be formulated in an absolute manner:
the bill contains no express exceptions to the rule. Only negative employment decisions
are prohibited, however. If genetic information is used in a positive manner, for instance
in the context of accommodating employees whose test results disclose a particular genetic
workplace risk or offering genetic services, this will probably not constitute an unlawful
employment practice. To this extent, however, the bill is not formulated very clearly. For
further details see J.H. Gerards, supra (footnote 84), p. 196ff, discussing the predecessor
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various legislative provisions offer clear standards to the targeted industries and
their narrow formulation might stand in the way of unfavourable interpretations
by the courts. It is not easy to predict whether narrowly defined exception clauses
will indeed offer more protection to individual interests. In addition, it is open
to doubt if such narrow clauses are sufficiently adaptable to continuous scientific
developments and unpredictable market reactions.182 It is difficult to answer such
questions until the moment the proposed legislation has entered into force and
courts have been confronted with cases arising from its application in practice.
Interestingly, the drafters of the present genetic non-discrimination bills seem to
have presaged that problems will arise and have provided for the establishment
of a committee six years after enactment of the Act to review the developing
science of genetics and to make recommendations for legislation.183 This solution
enables the legislature to accommodate for developments in genetic science without
necessitating the inclusion of wide exception clauses in the present legislation.
5. Conclusions
The increasing availability of predictive health information, in particular genetic
information, forms a blessing and a threat at the same time. It is valuable to have
information about health risks at one’s disposal, but it is also clear that predictive
health information is highly sensitive in character and should be carefully handled
by all actors who have a legitimate interest in collecting and using such informa-
tion. This is true in particular for non-medical actors, such as insurers and
employers. If such actors do obtain access to predictive health information and
use such information as a basis for decision making, they may harm a number
of important individual and social interests, varying from individual privacy and
non-discrimination interests to the interest in having adequate access to important
social goods such as health care and disability pensions.
Thus, the availability of genetic and other predictive health information has caused
highly complex dilemmas, which national and federal/supranational governments
have found difficult to solve. It is clear to most governments that some form of
regulation of the access to genetic and other (predictive) health information by
of S. 306 SE (S. 1053 SE).
182 Cf. H.T. Greely, supra (footnote 3), p. 1504, C.S. Diver and J.M. Cohen, supra (footnote
12), p. 1453 and D. Hellman, supra (footnote 13), p. 83.
183 See S. 306 SE § 208(b)-(e) and H.R. 1227 § 208(b)-(e), providing for the establishment
of a Genetic Nondiscrimination Study Commission.
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non-medical actors is called for, but there is much less consensus as to the design
of such regulation. It is particularly for this reason that we have endeavoured to
distinguish a number of different aspects pertinent to regulation of predictive health
information. One of the most important of these relates to the question whether
regulation should focus on genetic information alone, or should rather be directed
at a wider category of health information. Although there seems to be little
consensus on this issue in practice, we have concluded that the latter option is
to be preferred (§ 2), not in the least because of the difficulties related to the
definition of genetic information.
Whatever definition of the relevant information is chosen, however, it is clear that
regulation will also require a balance to be struck between a variety of conflicting
interests of equal importance and value. Although it is possible to reach tentative
theoretical conclusions as to where such a balance could be found, the comparative
analysis has shown that the outcomes of balancing exercise may be different in
various legal systems. Any choice to be made in this regard does not only depend
on theoretical or political views on the reasonableness of a certain outcome, but
also on the political, social and historical backgrounds and the internal organisation
of a particular legal system. Decisions as to specific forms of regulation may be
influenced by the need for such forms of regulation in the legal system at hand.
Hence, it would seem to be impossible to indicate with any precision how the
various relevant interests should be weighed and balanced in general. Still, the
comparative analysis presented in Section 4 shows that the main line of the con-
clusions reached in Section 3 is reflected in most of the national measures and
proposals we have studied. The conclusions reached in that section may thus
legitimately be regarded as a base line for further regulation in the area.
An issue that we did find little consensus on in the comparative review is the
proper level of regulation. In theory, legislation adopted at the federal or supra-
national level might seem to be most effective because of the legal certainty and
equality created by such legislation. The patchworks of protection which currently
exist in both the United States and in Europe would be removed by such uniform
legislation, which would have great advantages for employers and insurance
businesses operating across the national borders. On the other hand, it is clear that
such legislation would conflict with the desire to take account of national particu-
larities and differences. Especially if the differences between the states concern
fundamental characteristics of health insurance systems, as in the European Union,
it would not seem to be desirable to impose harmonising legislation which would
deeply intrude in the national health organisation systems. This is different for
the United States, where the differences in health organisation and insurance
regulation between the states seem to be less pronounced. For that reason it might
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be easier to introduce uniform legislation in the US than in Europe. For other areas,
such as that of life insurance, the differences seem to be less distinct and
harmonisation would be less out of place. It is clear, however, that this is only
one part of the issue. Of even more practical importance is the fact that
harmonising, federal or supranational measures may only be introduced if the
constitutional division of competence allows for such measures to be taken. Indeed,
there is much uncertainty as to this both in the European Union and in the United
States. As long as the division of competence remains unaltered, it is probable
that future regulatory efforts will mainly take place on the national level.
Much more congruity is visible as to the areas of regulation. The comparative
study has shown that regulatory efforts are currently limited to the areas of employ-
ment and health insurance and, to a lesser extent, life insurance, disability insurance
and long term care insurance. Indeed, the collection and use of genetic information
by employers and insurers currently seems to be most problematic. These actors
have already shown concrete interest in acquiring predictive health information
and they may use it in a way which may hamper individual access to such import-
ant goods as health care or employment. In due time, it may be possible to widen
the scope of legislation or other measures to other areas, but for the time being,
it is reasonable to limit regulatory efforts to employment and insurance.
Some European states appear to have included general non-discrimination and
privacy provisions in their national constitutions, mainly because of the expressive
and symbolic value of such provisions. It is clear, however, that a constitutional
prohibition is seldom sufficient to strike an effective balance between the various
interests concerned. As far as the choice between regulatory instruments is con-
cerned, the introduction of statutory legislation may be favoured over purely
constitutional protection and, as far as relevant, over wide (judicial) interpretation
of existing legislation. Newly introduced, specific legislation (or specific additions
to existing legislation) may contain clear exception clauses which accommodate
for the conflicting interests of employers and insurers and which may contain
provisions that allow for adaptation to future scientific and social developments.
The advantage of this approach is that legal certainty and clarity are created and
that more specific protection is offered to all interests concerned. In that respect
it does not seem to matter much if specific statutory legislation is sectoral in
character (which means that it is specifically designed for the area of employment
or for a certain type of insurance) or more general (e.g. in the shape of amendment
of a general non-discrimination law so to include the ground of genetic informa-
tion), as long as the legislation strikes a clear and reasonable balance between
the various interests described in Section 3.
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The comparative analysis has further shown that the protection of privacy and
non-discrimination interests and the access to health care, employment and other
social goods may be realised to some extent by self-regulation. The imposition
of moratoria and ceiling setting are examples of useful instruments that the industry
may rely on – the example of the UK has shown that these instruments are working
in a rather satisfactory way. In particular, self-regulation would appear to be useful
if statutory legislation is not likely to be introduced on the short term and if
interpretation of existing legislation would not seem to offer adequate protection
of the various interests at risk. The American example of the life insurance industry
shows, however, that not all industries will be willing to impose self-regulatory
measures. The industry has voiced some relevant objections to such instruments
as ceiling setting which may make them less effective. For that reason, we would
submit that self-regulation should not be considered as a definitive solution to the
dilemmas surrounding the access to predictive health information by insurers. In
the end, clear statutory legislation provides a more effective means to reconcile
the various conflicting interests.
As far as the content of such statutory legislation is concerned, we stress that such
legislation is meant to protect individuals against unwarranted disclosure and use
of their personal health information. In order to do so, lawmakers may rely on
either a privacy approach – guaranteeing the confidentiality of genetic information
by prohibitions on disclosure – or a non-discrimination approach – prohibiting
discriminatory use of predictive health information. Although the choice between
these approaches may stem from the particularities of a certain legal system, we
would submit that a combination of both approaches is to be preferred. To be
effective, national legislation should (and to a large extent already does) restrict
both access to genetic information and the use of such information to the dis-
advantage of the individual.
The last issue to be discussed is whether it is more desirable to introduce statutory
legislation that is formulated in a broad and flexible way, or, alternatively, in a
highly detailed manner. The choice between these alternatives will to some extent
depend on legal tradition, but some middle ground may be found. In many legal
systems there seems to be a preference for exception clauses that leave some room
for interpretation, yet still contain well-described standards and criteria to make
clear under which conditions the use of genetic information is allowed. Specific
aims may be formulated (e.g. protection of the health of employees) and high
standards may be set with respect to the suitability, necessity and proportionality
of the use of predictive health information as a means to reach this aim, or with
respect to the circumstances under which such information may be collected.
Finally, a specific measure provided for in the American genetic non-discrimination
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bills seems to be worth copying by other lawmakers. The bills provide for a five
year cycle of revision of the relevant provisions, thus creating a possibility to adapt
the regulations to new scientific developments and the discovery of new techniques
and remedies, but also to the effects of the legislation for the employment sector
and the insurance industry. Thus, the legislation remains rather flexible and adapt-
able, which is a valuable asset in a fast-changing area such as that of genetic
medicine.
